�On the moral use of aesthetic practices�

�On the moral use of aesthetic practices� is an educational text about taste as something that helps people for the practice of virtues. Taste, here, is a component of freedom in which the person acts and behaves from inner drive.

On the moral use of aesthetic behaviour

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The author of the essay “On the danger of aesthetic behaviour” has, previously, in the eleventh issue of the “Horen” of the year 1795, doubted rightfully about a morality, which is grounded alone on the feelings of Beauty and has taste alone as its advisor.

 

However, a vivacious and pure feeling for Beauty has obviously the most fortunate influence on the moral life, and about this I will discuss here. If I ascribe to taste the merit to contribute to the advancement of morality, hence, my opinion can really not be that the portion which good taste takes in an action; can make this action into a moral one.

The moral disposition may never have any other ground than itself. Taste can favour the morality of the behaviour, as I hope to prove in this current attempt, however, it alone, through its influence, can never produce anything moral. It is, here, really the same case with the internal and moral freedom as well as with the external, physical freedom; for, I act only freely, according to the last meaning, if I, independently from any foreign influence, follow only my willpower.

However, the possibility, to follow my own willpower unlimitedly, can I, hence, at last have to thank a ground different than myself, as soon as it will be accepted that the last one could be limiting my willpower. In the same way, I can have to thank, finally, hence, a ground different from my reason, the possibility to act well, as soon as this last one will be thought of as a force, which could have been limiting my freedom of mind.

Hence, just as people can really say that a human being receives freedom from another human being, even if freedom itself consist in people dispensing themselves to be directed from others, people can also really say that taste helps virtue, even if virtue itself declares expressly that people, for that end, use not any foreign help.

An action ceases, for that reason, really not, to be called free as soon as we only know that the acting person, by this fact, followed only his own willpower without consideration of a foreign willpower, because, opportunely, this foreign willpower, which could be limiting it, remains dormant. In the same way, an internal action loses, for that reason, the predicate of a moral action not yet, because opportunely, are lacking the attempts which could have cancelled them, as soon as we accept only that the acting person, by that fact, only followed the pretence of his reason, hence, omitting any foreign mainspring.

The freedom of an external action lies only on its direct origination from the willpower of the person, while the morality of an internal action lies only on the direct determination of the willpower through the rule of reason. It can become more difficult or easier for us, to act as free human beings, every time we encounter forces which must be acting against and defeating our freedom.

In so far, there are degrees of freedom. Our freedom is greater, more visible at least, when we affirm it, still, in such a violent resistance against hostile forces; however, it ceases not, when our willpower finds not any resistance, or if a foreign power interferes in and destroys this resistance without our consent.

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