On naive and sentimental poetry

In �On naive and sentimental poetry�, Schiller describes the role of the writer in a generous and breathtaking style as that of �a divinity behind the edifice of the world� who strives at giving �Humanity the best possible version of its complete expressi

On naïve and sentimental poetry

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

There are moments in our life where we dedicate to Nature as we see it in plants, minerals, animals, landscapes as much as in the human nature in children, in the customs of rural people and those of Antiquity, a kind of love and emotional respect, neither because these subjects benefit our senses nor because they satisfy our mind or taste (the contrary can, often, result from both) but rather because they simply represent Nature.

 

Every fine man who is not really and totally lacking sentiments, experiences this matter when he wanders outside, when he lives in the countryside or journeys through the monuments of the ancient times, in short, when he, in terms of artificial relationships and settings, is amazed with the plainness of Nature. What underlies many of our predilections for flowers and animals, simple gardens, walk ways, the countryside and its people, many objects from Antiquity and anything similar; is a feeling which is an interest often raised to a need, which may suppose that neither affectation nor other fortuitous interest are in play in these matters.

 

This kind of interest for Nature occurs, however, only under two conditions. Firstly, it is necessary, throughout, that the subject which influences us be Nature itself or otherwise, is taken for such by us; secondly, that this subject (in the widest meaning of the word) be naïve, i.e. that Nature stays in contrast with Art and disgraces it. As soon as the last condition is added to the first one and not until then, does Nature become naïve. Nature, in this kind of perspective, is to us nothing else than the expression of a voluntary existence, the affirmation of the object through itself, the ability to exist according to its own and immutable laws.

 

This presentation is simply necessary if we should take interest in these same appearances. Could someone be able to give to an artificial flower the appearance of Nature with the most perfect illusion; could someone be able to achieve the imitation of the naïve in his manners to the highest illusion, then, the discovery that these manners are imitations would really destroy the feeling, of which the discussion is about here . From this, it results that this kind of pleasure derived from Nature is not an aesthetical but rather a moral one, for it is conveyed through an idea, but is not immediately produced through observation; and also that its aim is really and totally not the Beauty of the forms.

 

What would an inconspicuous flower, a spring, a moss stone, a bird twittering, a bee hum etc. have in themselves that is so pleasing to us? What could have given them really pretence to our liking? It is not these subjects themselves but rather the idea exhibited through them that we love. We love in them the quiet, creative work of life, its calm action on itself, the carrying of its existence according to its own laws, its inner necessity and its eternal unity with itself. They are what we were; they are what we should be again. We were Nature as them and our culture should, on its way to reason and freedom, lead us back to Nature. They are, hence, at the same time, exhibition of our lost childhood which remains eternally the most valuable thing to us, and in that respect, they fill us with a certain melancholy. At the same time, these exhibitions are to us the highest perfection of the ideal and in that respect; they set us into a transcendental emotion. However, their perfection is not their merit because it is not the result of their choice.

 

They grant us, without by that fact shaming us, hence, the really specific delight that they are our model. As a constant apparition of the Gods, they surround us, however, more as something comforting than blinding. What makes up their character is exactly what is missing in ours to reach its perfection and what differentiates them from us, is exactly what lacks them in order to reach divinity. We are free and they are necessary, we change while they remain the same. However, only when both are joined, when the willpower follows freely the law of necessity and follows freely every manifestation of necessity and affirms the rule of reason in every manifestation of fantasy, is the divine or the ideal obtained. We eternally see in them, hence, what is lacking in us, or what we are deemed to strive for and if we will never exactly equal them, hence, we may only hope to approach them through infinite steps. We see in ourselves an advantage which lacks them but which either they never, in general, share with us as is the case with irrationality or not otherwise than by following our steps as is the case with childhood.

 

They procure to us, in that respect, the sweetest enjoyment of our Humanity as idea, even if they must necessarily make us humble in consideration of every determined condition of our Humanity. As this interest for Nature is based on an idea, hence, it can address itself only to minds which are already receptive to ideas; i.e. to moral concerns. By large, most people really affect this interest and the generalization of this sentimental taste in our time which manifests itself, particularly since the appearance of certain writings, in sentimental journeys and such things as gardens, promenades and other hobbies of this kind, is still really and totally not a proof of the generalization of this kind of sentiment. For Nature will always manifest, somehow, this kind of sentiment, even to the most insensitive people because the one thing that unites all men, is the disposition to reach for the moral and we are all, without any difference, the more attracted to this idea, the greater the gap between our acts and the simplicity and truth of Nature is.

 

This sentimentality for Nature manifests itself particularly strong and most commonly towards such subjects which stay in narrow relationship with us and puts us even closer in retrospect with ourselves and with the unnatural in us, as for example, when we are in the presence of children and childlike people. One errs when one believes that it is really the presentation of helplessness which explains that in certain instances, we experience so many emotions with children. This may be the case for people who, towards the weak, care to feel nothing else but their own superiority. However, the feeling of which I speak of (it only happens during really specific moral dispositions and is not to be confused with the feeling which the cheerful activity of the children arouses in us) is rather humiliating than favourable for the opinion of oneself; and when, indeed, an advantage is to be considered there, hence, it is, at least, not on our side.

 

Not because we look down upon the child from the height of our force and perfection but rather because we look up from the limitation of our conditions which is inseparable from the destiny which we once received, to the unlimited determinability in the child and to his pure innocence; we are feeling an emotion and our feeling, in such a moment, is too visibly mixed with a certain melancholy, so as to misjudge the source of the emotion itself. In the child, it is the disposition and the determination which are exhibited, while in us, it is always fulfilment which stays forever far behind these two characters.

 

The child is, hence, to us a concrete personification of the ideal; not really of the accomplished one but rather of the one we surrendered and it is not, hence, by any means, the presentation of his shortcomings and limits which moves us but to the contrary, it is really the presentation of his pure and free force, of his integrity, of his infinity. To the man of morality and sensitivity, a child will be, for that reason, a sacred subject, a subject namely, which through the greatness of an idea, destroys every greatness of experience and who wins again, substantially, in the judgment of reason, what he may lose in the judgment of rationality. Precisely from this contradiction between the judgment of reason and of rationality results the whole specific appearance of the mixed feeling which the naivety in the manner of thinking arouses in us. It links the childlike simplicity with the childish; there is, in the last one, a lack of guile which causes laughter for intelligence, through which we demonstrate our (theoretical) superiority.

 

As soon as we, however, have cause to believe that the childish simplicity is, at the same time, a childlike one; that consequently, not incomprehension, not incapacity but rather a higher (practical) strength, the source of which is a really innocent and true heart which disdained the help of artifice on the basis of an inner greatness; hence, is every triumph of soundness gone, and the mockery about credulity transforms itself into an admiration about simplicity. We feel ourselves compelled to respect the subject which we have laughed about before and as we look, at the same time, in ourselves, we just deplore that we are not similar to it. Hence, materializes the whole specific appearance of a feeling in which cheerful mockery, respect and melancholy flow together . It is demanded to the naïve subject that Nature prevails over artifice , this happens either against the knowledge and willpower of the person or with his whole conscience.

 

In the first case, it is the naivety of surprise and it amuses, in the other one, it is the naivety of sentiments and it emotionally moves. In the naivety of surprise, the person must be morally capable to deny Nature; in the naivety of sentiment, the person may not be capable to do so, hence, we should not think of him as physically incapable to do that, when something should affect us as naïve. The action and language of children give us, in this respect; only so long, the pure impression of the naïve, as we do not have in mind their incapacity to dissimulate and in general, take into consideration only the contrast of their authenticity against our artfulness.

 

The naïve character is childishness when it appears in unexpected circumstances and can precisely, for that reason, not be attributed to real childhood in its strictest meaning. In both cases, however, in the naivety of surprise, as in the one of the sentiment, Nature must be right and artifice wrong. Only through this last determination will the concept of naïve be completed. Affection is also an expression of Nature and the rule of good behaviour is somehow artificial, however, the victory of affection over convenience is nothing less than naïve. Should, to the contrary, affection prevail over artistic simplicity, over false civility, over dissimulation, hence, we do have not any hesitation to call it naïve . It will, hence, be demanded that Nature triumphs not through its blind power as dynamic but rather through its form as moral greatness, in short, that it triumphs over artifice not as need but rather as inner necessity.

 

This excerpt is 2 761 words. If you want to read further excerpts mease send a request to [email protected]

Author's Note

copy and paste the passsage that is not clear to you

Reviews

[Malenkov]

A well translated essay, and the original quality of Schiller seems to come across.

It would be nice perhaps to see how Schiller Aesthetics connects to the present, and it might be nice to have an essay from you or an introduction to act as a bridge for us, sad non-schillians to better appreciate his works. I'd also be interested to see who his though influenced more modern thinkers, dramatists etc simply out of curiousity.

The language itself seems true to the original . Because its in the High complex German style, its a touch long for english readers, because Schillers style is a high style of rhethoric and German itself is sometimes a complex language not easy to translate. For instance in the original the german reads:

Eben de�wegen ist des Menschen nichts so unw�rdig, als Gewalt zu erleiden,

Is perhaps Gewalt better translated as "violence" (as it conveys the sense of force used against one, whereas power is more abstract, such as the power one wields). Macht in German corresponds I think to power, Gewalt is used to denote force used against ones person: violence.

For readers perhaps not familiar with Schiller I think a little context would also be nice, to set his though up a little and incite me to dig deeper and see the connection of that thought with today. Does Schiller challenge for example the notion of rationality in art? Not saying he does but I would help me to anchor Schiller in the present and so help me appreciate him more. For example it would be nice in a short intro say at the top of each essay to introduce the concept of the sublime, define it in one or two sentences, for example from WIKI:

"the quality of greatness , physical, moral, intellectual, metaphysical or artistic; . The term especially refers to a greatness with which nothing else can be compared and which is beyond all possibility of calculation, measurement or imitation. This greatness is often used when referring to nature and its vastness."

A shorter version of that. Perhaps also compare the concept against other thinker from antiquity (longinius?) and modern thinkers (Adorno?). Those are nice to haves not must haves and dont affect the achivement of this piece in bringing a fine piece of work to our attention.

If you aim to publish for an academic audience, not doubt thats a bad suggestion, but if you would like to open Schiller up to others, I myself would appreciate a little paragraph or two at the top of this section (In one of my intro to philosophy books I have the author provides a little overview or asks questions designed to get me to engage the materila and then introduces the excerpts from thinkers. Otherwise, as suggested an introduction or overview would be nice to the body of thought in the way Kaufmann? for example does in his Existentialism where he shows the relevance.

While the translations feel accurate they do carry over in the english a slight woodeness (its those nebens�tze, compound words and split verbs that probably do it)- I recognize that from other German translations I have read (Hayek) and they do present for english readers a bit of a hurdle in that the style sounds a little long for English (perhaps modern ears.) But I remember also that after a while one gets used to the style but it might be worth considering a more modern style. The danger of course for a tranlsator is that it leaves you open to the charge of not staying true to the original text. However, I seem to recall that Ursula Le Guin rendered Lao Tzu: Tao Te Ching in a non literal format. The trade off is that the orginal style is lost, but it may make it more accessible. Thats a tougn decision to make, but perhaps you might consider this one for an audience more familiar with Schiller, and a more modern style (a al Le Guin) for those who want a more modern sounding Schiller.

Noticed also the essay seems to be cut off at the end..

I will add some notes to this hopefull thesy come out on the notes view.

Some other suggestions would be to put chapter numbers on the title to help readers navigate them and perhaps put them in book format on this site so they fit together in a collection.

All in all you have brought a great thinker, poets, dramatists work here and i enjoyed being introduced to Schiller whom I have never read before. Even without the suggestions above the work is enjoyable and of a high quality.


Excellent work!

[Andrew Dunham]

As for your Schiller translation... I like it, but it takes some getting
used to. One challenge is the sentences are sometimes too long. This may
have been OK 200 years ago, but it's hard to read now. One sentence (about the childish/childlike thing) is 78 words long! However, I really
like the ideas presented in it about nature and the morality held within.
It just needs to be updated for the 21st century somehow in order for it
to be accessible for today's reader. As an object of antiquity, it is
lovely, however. Bravo.