Further comments on the sublime

We call an object sublime, the one to whose presentation our sensible nature feels its limits, but our reasonable nature feels its superiority, its freedom from limits; against which we turn out, hence, to be physically less significant, but beyond which we elevate ourselves morally, that is, through ideas.

Only as sensible being are we dependent, as reasonable being we are free. The sublime subject gives us firstly: as natural creature, to feel our dependence, while it, secondly, makes us familiar with independence which we affirm as reasonable being over Nature, inside as well as outside ourselves. We are dependent in so far as something outside ourselves contains the ground, why something in ourselves becomes possible.

So long as the nature outside us is conform to the conditions under which something becomes possible in ourselves, so long, we can not feel our dependence. Should we become aware of the same dependence, hence, Nature must be presented as in argument with what represents need for us and hence, with what is only possible through its collaboration, or which says as much: Nature must find itself in contradiction with our impulses.

Now, all the impulses which are active as sensible existences in ourselves, can be traced back into two principal impulses. Firstly, we possess an impulse, to transform our condition, to manifest our existence; to be efficient, everything that concurs to acquire for ourselves presentations, hence, can be called instinct for presentation, instinct for knowledge.

Secondly, we possess an impulse to keep our condition, to pursue our existence, which will be called the instinct of self preservation. The instinct of presentation concerns knowledge, the instinct of self preservation feelings, hence, the inner perceptions of the existence.
We stay, hence, through these two fold impulses in double dependence relationships with Nature. The first one becomes noticeable to us if Nature lacks the conditions under which we succeeded into knowledge; the second one becomes noticeable to us if it contradicts the conditions under which it is possible for us to progress in our existence. In the same way, we affirm through our reason a double independence from Nature: firstly: in the sense that we (in theory) can go beyond the natural conditions and can think more about ourselves than we recognize; secondly: in the sense that we (in practice) can disregard ourselves beyond natural conditions and can contradict through our willpower, our desires.
A subject, by which perception we experience the first case, is theoretically great, it is the sublime of knowledge. A subject which allows us to feel the independence of our willpower, is practically great, it is the sublime of attitude.

In the theoretically sublime, Nature is in contradiction with the instinct of presentation, as object of knowledge. In the practically sublime, it stays in contradiction with the instinct of preservation, as object of sentiment. There, it would only be considered as a subject which should enlarge our knowledge; here, it will be presented as a power which can determine our own condition. Kant calls, in that sense, the practically sublime, the sublime of the power or the dynamically sublime, in contrary to the mathematically sublime.

Because, however, from the concepts of dynamic and mathematical nothing can really explain whether the sphere of the sublime is created through this division or not, hence, I have preferred the division into theoretical and practical sublime. In what manner we are dependent of the knowledge of natural conditions and we will be aware of this dependence, will be performed obviously in the development of the theoretically sublime. That our existence as sensible being is made dependent of natural conditions outside ourselves, will need hardly a specific proof.

As soon as the nature outside us manifests a determined relationship to us, on which our physical well being is grounded, hence, at the same time, our existence in the sensible world which sticks to this physical well-being, will also be contested and put into danger.
Nature has, hence, the conditions in its power under which we exist, and in this sense, we should be paying attention to this natural relationship which is so indispensable to our existence, hence, a watchful protector is being given to our physical life with the instinct of preservation, to this impulse however, a warning is being given with pain. As soon as, in that respect, our physical condition suffers a manifestation which menaces to determine it to its contrary, hence, the pain reminds of the danger and the instinct of preservation will be demanded, through it, into resistance. Should the danger be of the kind that presents our resistance as vain, hence, fear must take place. An object, hence, whose existence contradicts the conditions of our existence, is, if we feel ourselves not a match to it in power, a subject of fear, fearful.

However, it is only fearful for us as sensible being, for only as such, we depend of Nature. This part in ourselves, which is not Nature, which is not submitted to the natural law, has nothing to fear from the nature outside us, considered as power. Nature, presented as a power which, in truth, can determine our physical condition, but has on our willpower not any power, is dynamically or practically sublime.
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Author's Note

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