THE CONTROL AND COST OF ENERGYA Chapter by peppino ruggeriThe evolution of
the energy mix has been associated with changing structures in the production
and supply of various energy sources, leading to different forms and degrees of
control, and rising costs generated by a combination of increasing costs of production,
market power of producers, and heightened environmental effects. The Control
of Energy According to Smil
(2010), for most of pre-history and early human history work was done
exclusively through human muscle power, the energy converter was the human
body, and the energy source was the food obtained first from hunting and
gathering and later from cultivation. The only extra-somatic source of energy
was wood used for cooking and heating. Around 8,000 BCE, the domestication of
cattle increased the number of energy converters, which further expanded two
millennia later with the domestication of horses. Working animals also changed
the energy mix because both cattle and horses converted into kinetic energy
biomass not utilized by humans. These conditions lasted well past the Middle
Ages. In what I call the first Renewable Energy Age, there was little
separation between the producer and consumer of energy, even if we exclude the
energy from food consumed by humans. In the rural areas, where most of the
population resided, fuelwood and fodder were produced or collected by the fuel
users. Trade in energy took place in urban areas, but the supplies were
delivered from short distance. The decentralization of energy production and
distribution, and the associated absence of market power, was one of the main
features of this energy age. The separation
between supplier and consumer began to widen with expanded consumption of coal
in the first phase of the Great Energy Transformation. Coal deposits were
ubiquitous and did not grow like trees and grass. They were extensive, located
in specific areas, and their extraction required large financial commitments.
Coal was a tradable commodity. Still, the trade was largely localized. Although
it created large wealth for a limited number of families, it did not give rise
to market control in part because it was still competing with charcoal in urban
centers and fuelwood in rural areas. A similar
situation developed in the case of oil until 1960, a year in which five
countries " Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela " formed a cartel
known as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) for the
purpose of stabilizing (euphemism for controlling) the oil market. As other oil
producing countries realized the advantages of market power, membership in OPEC
expanded over time and currently includes eight additional countries: Angola,
Algeria, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya, Nigeria, and the United Arab
Emirates. As its market
power began to wane, resulting in lower oil prices, OPEC made special
arrangements with 10 additional countries for the purpose of coordinating oil
production: Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Brunei, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, Oman,
Russia, South Sudan, and Sudan. This new organization is known as OPEC+. The
implications of market power in the oil sector will be explored in the next
section. Here it suffices to note that the market power of oil producers is
made possible by the unique role of oil products in transportation and the
absence of alternatives. This role leads to a price-inelastic demand for oil
(limited response of quantity demanded even to large price increases) and a
situation where price increases result in higher revenues. The same path was
not followed by the producers of natural gas, for a variety of reasons. Natural
gas reserves are more evenly distributed than oil’s. While oil supplied the
needs of a sector " transportation - where up to now there has been no
competition, natural gas is used in a competitive market. It is used primarily
in the heating of building and electricity generation, functions that can be
performed by a variety of fuels, first coal and increasingly renewable
resources. Moreover, technological developments " primarily the liquefaction of
natural gas " have reduced the obstacles to its worldwide distribution. Because wind and
solar power are ubiquitous, attempts to form a cartel on these two energy
sources could not be met with success. In this case market power could exist
only for materials needed for harnessing these energy sources, if they
naturally in short supply. Even in this case, technological solutions would
render any potential market power ephemeral. ENVIRONMENTAL AND
SOCIAL COSTS For consumers, the
cost of energy reflected in the prices they pay includes only the direct costs
to firms for the production, transformation, and distribution of energy plus
the taxes imposed by governments. For them, an energy crisis is identified with
rising energy prices, at the pump and on utilities bills. For the planet and
for society as a whole, the costs are more extensive and more severe. In this section I focus on four major costs
of the current energy mix: climate change, control of energy, indirect
renewable energy costs, and the concentration of power. Climate
Change. The connection
between the energy mix and the cost of climate change is complex and involves
several steps: the production of greenhouse gases, the relationship of
greenhouse gases to climate change, and the economic, environmental, and social
costs of global warming. Greenhouse
Gases (GHG). These are gases
that are produced by a variety of processes on Earth. In the atmosphere they
absorb and trap some of the sun’s infrared radiation creating a greenhouse
effect that raises global temperatures. Most of these gases are produced by
human activity. They include four major components: carbon dioxide (CO2),
methane, nitrous oxide, and industrial gases. Table III-1 shows that annual GHG
emissions rose at an average rate of 1.7 percent per year from 1950 to 2021. A substantial deceleration from 1950-1975 to
1975-2000 was followed by a small acceleration during the following 21 years. A
similar pattern is found for CO2 but with stronger growth. Over the 71 years
from 1950 tom 2021, annual CO2 emissions rose at an average annual rate fifty
percent higher than that of GHG emissions. As a result, the share of CO2
emissions expanded from roughly one-third in 1950 to two-thirds in 2021. Table III-1.
Global Greenhouse Gas (GHG) and Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Emissions, Selected Years
from 1950 to 2021 GHG CO2 CO2/GHG CO2-C GT % Change GT
% Change PPM
% Change 1950 16.13 6.00 37.2 311.50 1975 30.17 17.05 56.5 331.36 1950-1975 2.54 4.27
0.79 2000 41.34 25.45 61.6 369.64 1975-2000 1.27 1.62
1.53 2021 54.59 37.12 68.0 416.43 2000-2021 1.33 1.81
2.33 1950-2021 1.73 2.60
1.48 Note:
CO2-C = CO2 concentration in parts per million (PPM); GT = gigatons; % change =
average annual percentage change. Source:
Hannah Ritchie and Max Roser, “Annual Greenhouse Gas Emissions: How Much Do We
Emit Each Year?” ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions; The Nature
Conservancy, “How Much Carbon Was in the Atmosphere When You Were Born?” Table III-2 provides information on the sources of GHG emissions. In 2016, nearly three-quarters of CO2 emissions were produced in the production and use of energy and an additional 18 percent in agriculture, forestry, and land use for a combined total of 92 percent. Within the energy category, one-third of emissions originated in the industrial sector, with buildings and transportation contributing 24 and 22 percent, respectively, for a combined total of 79 percent. Table III-2.
Global GHG Emissions: Shares by Sector, 2016
(a): Percent by Sector Energy Agriculturea Industryb Waste 73.2 18.4 5.2 3.2
(b): Percent within Energy Industry Buildings Transport Unallocatedc Leakagesd Agriculturee 33.1 23.9 22.1 10.7 7.9 2.3 Notes: a Agriculture, forestry, and land
use; b direct industrial processes; c unallocated fuel
combustion; d leakages from oil and gas production; e
agriculture and fishing. Source: Hannah Ritchie and Max Roser, “Emissions by
Sector,” ourworldindata.org/emissions-by-sector. Table III-3 focuses on CO2 emissions. Panel (a) shows
that in 2019 the leading source of CO2 emissions was the generation of
electricity and heat with a share of 43 percent,
followed by transportation (22%) and industry (21%) for a combined total of 86
percent. In 2021, coal accounted for 40 percent of CO2 emissions, with oil and
gas adding 32 and 21 percent, respectively, for a combined total of 93 percent. Table III-3.
Global CO2 Emissions: Shares by Sector and by Fuel (a):
Percent by Sector Year Electricity + Heat Transportation Industry Other 2019 42.8 22.3 21.3 13.6 (b):
Percent by Fuel Coal Oil Gas Other 2021 40.4 31.9 21.3 6.4 Source: Hannah
Ritchie and Max Roser, “CO2 Emissions by Sector,”
ourworldindata.org/CO2-emissions-by-sector; Hannah Ritchie and Max Roser, “CO2
Emissions by Sector,” ourworldindata.org/CO2-emissions-by-fuel. CO2 is not
dissipated in the atmosphere, but is accumulated over time. The concentration
of CO2 is measured in parts per million (PPM). The last column of table III-1
shows that the CO2 concentration rose at an average rate of 1.5 percent per
year. Moreover, the rate of accumulation has accelerated over time. For most of
human history before the expansion of industrialization after WWII, CO2
concentration was maintained at levels below 300PPM and even in 1950 it
remained slightly higher than this level. This suggests that the optimal
concentration of CO2 for ecological and human health is in the neighborhood of
300 PPM.1 By 2021 the 300 PPM mark had been exceeded by more than
one-third. This rapid expansion of the CO2 concentration had enormous
consequences for our planet. Global
Warming. The Earth
climate system is in balance when the amount of sun energy it receives is equal
to the amount of energy returning to space. When these two amounts differ, we
say that there is an Earth Energy Imbalance (EEI). If this imbalance is
positive " the amount arriving exceeds the amount returning " heat is absorbed
by the planet, creating the Earth Heat Inventory. Nine-tenth of this heat
accumulates in the oceans, and the rest on land, the cryosphere, and the
atmosphere. Research shows a positive trend in the value of EEI over the past
50 years. The average value of EEI rose from 0.5 during 1971-2006 to 0.79 in
the 2006-2018 period and 0.89 during 2010-2022.2 As increasing
amounts of solar radiations are trapped on Earth, global temperatures tend to
rise. Studies show a positive trend in global temperatures over the past two
decades. On average during the 2013-2023 period, global surface temperatures
were 1.15 degrees centigrade higher than during the baseline period from 1850
to 1900, higher than the estimated 0.91 degrees from 2003 to 2013, an increase
of 26 percent in a ten year-span (2008 versus 2018) (as above, table 4). An alternative
indicator of global warming is the deviation from the same baseline period of
the land annual maximum temperatures (excluding Antarctica). Average values of
this indicator by decade since the 1950s are shown in table III-4. The increase
in the average maximum land temperature over successive decades is notable in
the last column of this table. From the 1950s to the 1970s, the deviation from
the baseline value was stable and small, amounting to about one-third of a
degree centigrade. This deviation began to accelerate in the 1980s and has
continued ever since, reaching 1.7 degrees during 2012-2021 decade, a value
about four times higher than during the 1950-1980 period. We also notice in the
second column that the range of deviations expanded over successive decades,
indicating greater temperature variations within a decade. The range of
deviations in the 1990s was double that in the 1950s. There seems to be no
respite to the extreme temperatures According to a NASA study, July 2023 was
the hottest month since 1880.”3
Table III-4.
Estimated Deviations of Annual Maximum Temperatures by Decade since the 1950s Decade Deviations
from the 1850-1900 Baseline in 0C
Range withing Decade
Averagea 1950s
0 " 0.6
0.30 1960s
0.1 " 0.7
0.40 1970s
0.1 " 0.7
0.40 1980s
0.2 " 1.2
0.70 1900s
0.3 " 1.5
0.90 2000s
1.23b 2010s
1.64b 2012-2021
1.71b Notes: aauthor’s calculations assuming a
linear increase withing range; bfrom Forster et al. (2023), Table 8. Source: Forster et al. (2023), Figure 6 and Table 8.
Table III-5.
Determinants of Global Warming Determinant
Average Deviation in 0Ca
2010-2019 2013-2022 2017 2022
Observed 1.07 1.15 Anthropogenic 1.07 1.15 1.13 1.26 Natural
0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 Note: aDeviation from baseline in 1850-1900 Source: Forster (2023), Table 6. Global
Warming and Climate Change.
Global warming refers to an increase in global temperatures. It is both a
component and a determinant of climate change which refers to long-term
movements in a variety of climatic factors, primarily precipitation and wind
patterns. The effects of climate change induced by global warming are complex,
pervasive, and ubiquitous. The most significant ones are severe droughts,
widespread flooding, catastrophic storms, melting of glaciers and polar ice,
and rising sea levels. Regarding the last two effects, records show that the
sea level had increased by 1.7 millimiters per year during most of the 20th
century, but this value nearly doubled to 3.2 millimiters since 1993. In
addition, the average thickness of glaciers has shrunk by more than 60 percent
since 1980 and the area under ice has receded by 40 percent since 1979. There were 37 major global weather events in
2022 and they caused damages worth $360 billion.4 In addition, both
the frequency and cost of major climate events (damages exceeding $1 billion
each) rose dramatically from the1980s to the 2020s.5 The number of
major climate events increased by a factor of 4 from the 1980 decade to the
2010-2019 decade. In the first three years of the 2020 decade, there were 60
such events, nearly double the number of such events during the entire 1980s.
If the trend in the first three years continues unabated for the rest of the
2020 decade, the total number of major weather events will reach 200, a number
more than six times higher than during the 1980s decade. The cost of such
events has skyrocketed even when inflation and population growth are taken into
account. The real cost of the damage generated by the major weather events,
adjusted for inflation and population growth, estimated for the 2020 decade is
nearly 5 times that during the 1980s decade.
The health effects
of climate change are also more devastating and operate through various
channels. Floods, drought, fires, and wide temperature fluctuations impact
negatively food production and food security. According to the World Health
Organization (WHO, 2023), which refers to the sixth assessment report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 770 million people suffered
from hunger in 2020, mostly in Asia and Africa. The number of people
experiencing food insecurity increased by nearly 100 million from the average
during 1981-2010 to 2020. One-third of
the global population, predominantly in the poorer regions, lacks safe drinking
water and more than 10 percent is infected annually with foodborne illnesses. A
third of the latter are children. These conditions will be aggravated by global
warming. Temperature increases, especially the hot summers that are
transforming many areas of the world into nearly uninhabitable places, are
causing a rising tide of heat-related deaths, and 37 percent of these deaths
can be attributed to climate change. These health effects extend beyond
physical conditions and include mental health. Unbearable heat and frequent
catastrophic climatic events cause anxiety and some cases post-traumatic stress
that harm a person’s mental and emotional conditions and may even disrupt the
relationships of social support. These effects are
not shared equally among all people, but tend to impact mostly the weakest
members of society. As pointed out by the World Health Organization (2023),
nearly half of the world population lives in areas with the greatest risks from
climate change, and they reside largely in the poorest countries. Because of
their meager economic conditions, they contribute minimally to global warming,
but they bear most of the burden of its effects. The costs of
weather events caused by climate change are not expected to abate for a long
time under realistic assumption about future emission because of the existing
high level of CO2 concentration in the atmosphere. According to Usher (2019),
(Bruce Usher, 2019), Renewable Energy, New York: Columbia University
Press) under a “business as usual” scenario the CO2 concentration is projected
to rise from 416 PPM in 2021 to 480 in 2050. The transition to renewable energy
would simply reduce this increase to about 450 PPM. This means that the climate
sins of the parents will continue to be paid by their children even if they
become ecologically virtuous. However, they can mitigate the price they pay by
rejecting the behavior of their parents. The
Renewables Footprint.
Although the renewable energy resources are very large and inexhaustible, their
development is not free of costs, both financial and ecological. The generation
of electricity from renewables requires devises that contain a variety of
minerals and storing this energy for use, particularly in transportation,
requires more minerals. Thus, the decarbonization of the economy involves in
part a shift from one type of non-renewable resource to another. The question
is: do we improve environmental health and the ecological balance when we shift
the energy mix in favor of renewables?
To address this, researchers have developed a measure called Total
Material Requirement (TMR). Watari et al. (2019) have used this indicator to
analyze the ecological effects of a shift in the energy mix from fossil fuels
to renewables. They compared the TMR of two energy scenarios. The first is
called RTS and it models the maintenance of the current energy system
associated with the voluntary targets pledged by a number of countries in the
Paris Agreement. The second is called 2DS and is based on a path to
decarbonization developed by the IEA. They also divided their analysis between
production (the generation of electricity) and consumption (transportation
only). With respect to
electricity, under the RTS scenario the level of the TMR indicator will
increase by16 percent from 2021 to 2025. Renewables will account for a small
portion of this increase because their share of electricity generation is not
projected to expand dramatically. In the 2DS scenario, the TMR indicator is cut
in half from 2021 to 2050 primarily because the use of coal in electricity
generation is projected to plummet during this period. This means that, with
respect to electricity generation, policies of decarbonization relying on the
replacement of fossil fuels with renewables would tend to reduce the total
material requirements and improve the ecological balance. A different
conclusion is reached in the case of transportation. In the RTS scenario, the
TMR indicator doubles from 2021 to 2050 and most of this increase is due to the
expansion of renewables as the moderate increase in gasoline consumption will
have a small effect on TMR. Under the 2DS scenario, the increase in TMR is only
sixty percent, mainly because the contribution of gasoline consumption
declines. The general
conclusion is that a policy of de-carbonization will tend to reduce TMR in
electricity generation and raise it in transportation. Moreover, while the RTS scenario is
dominated by flows of energy resources, the 2DS scenario is dominated by
mineral resources. Thus, decarbonization may not lead to a greater ecological
balance by simply shifting from an ecological negative that generates global
warming and climate change to a negative that disrupts the environment in the
countries and localities where the needed minerals are extracted and processed.
This change will also affect the global distribution of the ecological impact.
While the effects of global warming tend to be ubiquitous, the ecological
effects of the expansion of mineral production will be more localized. Since
these minerals are found more frequently in lower income countries, a policy of
de-carbonization based on the expansion of renewable will shift the ecological
cost of economic development from the more developed to the less developed
countries.
The Control
of Energy. Energy resources
are not like any other tradeable good " such as refrigerators, cars, or
apparel. Because they are fundamental to human survival and they are not
dispersed equally throughout the globe, they have become weapons in the
geopolitical arena as resource-rich countries try to gain power over the energy
market. The most recent example is the use of natural gas by the Russian
Federation in the early stages of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Having cultivated
Europe’s dependence in its natural supply, Russia leveraged its market power to
influence the decisions of European countries. This strategy worked well during
the 2014 annexation of Crimea and may have worked as well in its full invasion
of the Ukraine had the United States maintained the more neutral stance they
took in 2014. Of the three major
primary energy sources in the current energy mix " the three fossil fuels:
coal, oil, and natural gas " oil is the only one with a formalized institution
of market control: first OPEC and later OPEC+. OPEC exercised its
power for the first time in October 1973 when it refused to sell oil to the
United States for its support of Israel during the Yom Kippur war. The effects
of this action on the price of oil were immediate and strong: the price of oil,
which had declined from $33 per barrel in January 1950 to $25 in May 1973,
nearly tripled in January 1974 as it rose to $67. Although the embargo was lifted six months
later, its effects were felt all over the globe as real GDP growth was reduced
to 1.8 percent in 1974 and less than one percent in 1975, a fraction of its
post-war trend. More recently, the
power of OPEC+ has become evident in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic.
Due to the pandemic, oil prices (WTI) plummeted to $25 per barrel in March
2020. As world economies began to recover from lockdowns, oil prices rose,
reaching $73 per barrel in April 2021. In response to production controls by
OPEC+, oil prices continued to rise and reached $120 per barrel in May 2022. As
they began declining towards a low level of $71 per barrel in June 2023, OPEC+
in April 2023 announced a production cut of over 1.5 million barrels per day
for the rest of the year. As a result, oil prices reversed trend and approached
$90 per barrel in September 2023. The effects of the market power of OPEC+ are
significant and widespread. The increase in oil prices by a factor of 2.4 from
September 2021 to May 2022 was a major contributor to worldwide inflation and
the more recent oil price spike will make the task of the monetary authorities
more difficult. In addition, if price increases have significant distributional
impacts. Internationally, there is a large transfer of wealth from oil
importing to oil exporting countries. Nationally, high oil prices generate
large profits for oil companies and these profits benefit primarily the
shareholders of these companies, affecting the degree of wealth inequality. The
Concentration of Power I have suggested
earlier that for most of human history the supply of energy was “democratic” in
the sense that the control over energy resources was dispersed. Urban dwellers
did require to purchase fuel, but they were a small proportion of the total population
and the suppliers of energy were small businesses. In the rural areas, where
the majority of the population lived, the energy consumer controlled his/her
own supply. This pattern was not disturbed by the expansion of coal after the
industrial. Coal production did entail a certain degree of centralization of
production, giving rise to localized power in the energy industry, but coal
remained a small source of energy well into the 19th century. The concentration of power over energy
resources increased with industrialization and the associated expansion of coal
production. By 1900, coal had become the main primary energy source with a
share of 53 percent. Together with oil (2.0 %), gas (0.6%) and hydro (0.6%),
the energy sources with concentrated control accounted for 56 percent of total
energy consumption. The degree of
concentration in the production of energy increased with the expansion of
fossil fuels in the energy mix. By 1950, fossil fuels accounted for 69 percent
of total energy consumption, and this share increases to 72 percent if we add
hydroelectric power generation, a centralized renewable energy source. The centralization
of power in the production of the “new” energy sources, i.e. other than
traditional fuelwood and fodder, arises from the very nature of the resources:
to be produced in the most economical way, they need large capital
expenditures. This requirement led to two major developments: the concentration
of power in the energy industry (very few producers and, in some cases,
nationalization of the resource), and the expansion of the financial system to
address the financing needs of large capital projects. This process led to
increasing concentration of wealth and political power. Ranking of
Energy Resources by Cost Policies on the
decarbonization of the energy supply have focused largely on coal because it
has the higher CO2 concentration of any fuel. When the policy objective is the
reduction of CO2 emissions, this focus is warranted. As shown in table III-6,
in 2021 fossil fuels accounted for 92 percent of CO2 emissions and coal was the
top contributor with a share of 42 percent. Moreover, the coal’s share of CO2
emissions was 60 percent higher than its share of the primary energy supply. Table III-6. CO2
Emissions-intensity of Fossil Fuels in 2021 Share of CO2 Emissions/ Coal Oil Natural Gas Share of Supply 1.6 1.0 0.9 Source: IEA, Gloabal Energy Review CO2 Emissions in
2021 " Data; Table in this book
When the production
and use of energy generates a variety of negative effects, focusing on CO2
emissions may lead to misleading conclusions and misguided policies. In table
III-7, I suggest a ranking of primary energy sources based on a more complete
evaluation based on the types of negative effects discussed above. In this
evaluation, the category “ecological impact” is separated from the CO2 emission
category. The latter refers to the effects of energy production/consumption on
the climate while the former deals with the environmental impacts and mining
(directly in the case of coal and indirectly in the case of renewables). For
each fuel, I assigned a value of 0 to 10 to emissions and control because their
effects are global and very consequential. To the other two factors I assigned
values between 0 and 5 because their effects are weaker and largely
localized. The values for the CO2
emissions are based on table III-6. For the ecological impact, I considered a
variety of factors. The largest
ecological impact is assigned to coal, not just for its mining, but its
transportation and use because of its bulkiness. The other energy sources are
assigned a slightly lower value, but for
different reasons. Nuclear power because of the risks associated with a major
failure or disaster, as evidenced by a number of cases; oil because of the
effects of drilling operations, pipelines, and potential risks of oil spills.
Renewables have a relatively high value of ecological effect directly in the
case of hydro and indirectly in the case of other renewables (mining of
necessary minerals). The lowest value is assigned to natural gas because its
effects are largely limited to drilling and pipelines. Renewables other than
hydro differ from all other sources because their effects are mainly generated
in the consumption phase. The control of energy is largely an issue related to
oil because of OPEC. I assigned the top value for concentration of power to the
first four energy sources because their characteristics lead to industries with
very few large companies. This is true also of hydroelectric power. Although
the technology exists for the “democratization” of the energy supply in the case
of solar and wind energy, the supply-side focus of current energy policy is
leading also to centralization. That’s why I have assigned a high value to
renewables. Overall, the most injurious form of primary of energy is oil,
followed by coal and natural gas. This means that the focus of decarbonization
policies on coal is misplaced and may have serious long-term consequences.
While reducing coal consumption is the most effective way to lower CO2
emissions, maintaining current levels of oil consumption has implications for
geopolitics and international economic stability that may be as important as
climate change effects. According to my rankings, the energy policy priority
should be directed at reducing the consumption of oil. If this would retard the
decline in coal consumption, as potential shifts to electric cars would require
higher levels of electricity generation which may not be met by renewable
energy, the environmental effects may be mitigated by stronger restrictions on
the operation of coal-burning plants and aggressive CO2-capture measures.
Table III-7. Ranking of Primary Energy Sources with
Respect to Costs
CO2 Emissions Ecological Control Concentration Total
Impact of Energy of Power
Oil 8 3 10 5 26 Coal 10 4 2 5 21 Natural Gas 6 2 4 5 17 Nuclear 0 3 0 5 8 Renewables 0 3 0 4 7 Notes: 1Andrew Moseman, 18 May 2021, “What Is the Ideal Level
of Carbon Dioxide in the Atmosphere for Human Life?”, MIT Climate Portal. 2Piers M. Forster and other 49 contributors (2023),
“Indicators of Global Climate Change 22: Annual Update of Large-Scale
Indicators of the State of the Climate System and Human Influence,” Earth
System Science Data, ARTICLE, Vol. 15, Issue 6, pp. 2295-2327, Table 5. 3Nasa, 14 August 2023, “NASA Clocks July 2023 as the
Hottest Month on Record Ever since 1880”. 4Jeff Masters, 30 January 2023, “Dozens of
Billion-dollar Weather Disasters Hit Earth in 2022,” Yale Climate
Connections. 5Adam B. Smith (10 January 2023), “22 U.S.
Billion-dollar Weather and Climate Disasters in Historical Context,” Climate.Gov.
References Vaclav Smil
(2010), Energy Transitions: History, Requirements, Prospects,
Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger. World Health
Organization (2023), “Climate Change.” Tacuma Watari, Benjamin C. Mclellan, Damien Garcia,
Elsa Dominich, Eisi Yamasue, Keisuke Nansai (2019), “Total Material
Requirements for the Global Energy Transition to 2050: A Focus on Transport and
Electricity,” Resources, Conservation and Recycling, Elsevier, Volume
148 (20 September 2019), pp. 91-103.
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Added on April 28, 2024 Last Updated on April 28, 2024 Authorpeppino ruggeriHanwell, New Brunswick, CanadaAboutI am a retired academic. I enjoy gardening, writing poems and short stories and composing songs which may be found on my youtube channel Han Gardener or Spotify under peppino ruggeri. more..Writing
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