Fire on the Mountain

John Maclean’s book Fire on the Mountain shares the story of the South Canyon Fire in 1994.  The fire had been burning for three days and the small crew struggled to get the fire under control.  When the fire spread below the crew on the mountain, it created a disaster.  The fire exploded and raced to the top of the mountain, killing twelve firefighters in its path.  Although it would appear the firefighters were being irresponsible by letting the fire get below them, the firefighters were actually too understaffed to do their job properly.  Only forty-nine fire fighters were working on a fire spread over hundreds of acres which calls for a much larger crew.  If the crew was properly staffed with an aerial observer to monitor the fire and enough firefighters, the disaster would be avoided.  Some people who read Fire on the Mountain could argue that the crew should have known the fire was below them, but they were too understaffed to monitor the fire.  Some people might think that Dick Good could have been a helpful eye from the sky, but he was inexperienced, and the crew left the fire when they realized they were in danger, which is the responsible thing to do.

The South Canyon Fire was a disaster due to many mistakes.  One important mistake was on July 6th when the firefighters let the fire get below them.  They were spread across the mountain working on the west flank fire line and across Hell’s Gate Ridge when the fire.  Their position ranged from one thousand to two thousand feet above where the fire below them blew up.  Someone might argue that the crew should have known the fire was below them and left sooner.  If the crew knew the fire was below them, they would have realized the danger they were in and left the mountain before the blowup occurred.  As a firefighter, it is very important to know the position of the fire.  Maclean says, “[e]very firefighter knows the rule: Never let a fire get below you on a mountain.  Only bears and fires, not firefighters, can run uphill faster than down” (84).  The crew needed to know that fire was below them to ensure their own safety.  A smoke column was a sign that the fire could be below the men, but was not checked by any of the firefighters.  This can lead to people believing the firefighters were irresponsible.  Maclean shows us when the fire could have gotten below them.

[Scholz] saw instead a column of smoke, small but distinct, rising from the western drainage.  The low ridge blocked his view of its source, but it seemed to be coming from near where the Prineville crew should be working.  If the smoke column signaled that fire had slipped below the crew, real danger threatened...Sholz radioed Shepard a second time and asked if he could see where the smoke column was coming from.  “Is anybody dealing with it?” Shepard replied that couldn’t see that far, his view was blocked by spur ridges, but the jumpers should be right about there.  The jumpers were on it. (84-85)

Clearly there were signs that the fire was below them.  One could say it was irresponsible of Shepard to assume the Prineville hot shots were working on that smoke source without double checking with them.

Although it would appear that the firefighters were being irresponsible, they were actually too understaffed to properly work the fire.  They had so few firefighters that they were all preoccupied trying to get the fire under control to monitor the location of the fire.  According to the map prior to Part I in Fire on the Mountain, twelve firefighters were working on the west flank fire line, about one thousand feet from the source of the blowup, eight smokejumpers were climbing towards Hell’s Gate Ridge to help make a fire line with nineteen other firefighters (Front Piece).  This shows that everyone was being used to put up fire lines to get the fire under control.  For a fire that size, they did not have enough people to properly maintain the fire.  Maclean says, “[t]he crew on the mountain was at its moment of greatest strength, numbering forty-nine plus a helicopter and pilot.  Yet it had a command structure suited for the first hours of attack on a small fire, not a time-consuming battle over hundreds of acres” (88).  Clearly the crew was already overwhelmed trying to get this massive fire under control.  It is no surprise that a piece of the fire managed to get below such a small crew.  People may think it was irresponsible that the they let the fire get below them, but they were too understaffed to monitor the fire.

One could argue that the firefighters could have know the fire was below them with the help of Dick Good, who was flying the helicopter 93 Romeo.  An eye from the sky could have spotted the fire below them and warned the firefighters.  Good flew between Storm King Mountain and a farm pond for water close to every ten minutes, over the source of the blowup.  Some people might think it is hard to believe that Good did not see the source of the fire that was endangering the entire crew when he flew over the source of the blowup multiple times.

Although Dick Good did have an overview advantage to see the fire, he was untrained to spot fires and busy dropping water.  Maclean points out that Good was the only man using a helicopter that day, when they should have at least one more chopper helping out:

By now Dick Good in 93 Romeo had become a one-main air show.  He had hauled people and gear to the ridge, hauled gear away and in between tried to deal with questions from Don Mackey and Dale Longanecker about what the fire looked like from the air.  Good was not a trained aerial observer and already had too much to do. (107)

Clearly Dick Good was not prepared to spot fires due to lack of training and being overworked.  Even if he was trained to be an aerial observer, the smoke was difficult to spot.  Maclean says, “[t]he South Canyon fire, for its part, played an almost deliberate game of hide-and-seek.  It smoked enough in its two-tree base to alarm motorists and nearby residents.  But when the proper authorities showed up, it disappeared, first when the jumpers came in sight, and then a second time” (21). This fire was obviously hard to spot before it blew up, and because Good was not an aerial observer, it is understandable that he had trouble spotting the smoke.  This shows that the crew needed a trained aerial observer and more helicopters working the fire.  Good was not irresponsible for not seeing the fire, but instead proved that the crew were understaffed.

The firefighters did not notice that the fire had gotten below them, but when they realized they were in danger, they started evacuating the mountain. Instead of being careless as some people might think, they were quick to head for safety. Scholz and his crew spotted the flames at the beginning of the blowup and took the correct actions by leaving.  Maclean says, “A tip of flame showed itself ahead, rising in a scarlet-orange wave from the western side of Hell’s Gate Ridge.  The wave began to sweep toward [Scholz and his crew of nineteen]. ‘What the f**k are we doing here?’ yelled Simmons...Scholz, bringing up the rear, heard cursing and saw the wave of flame. ‘Reverse and move,’ Scholz yelled, the firefighters bugle call for retreat” (144).  Obviously the firefighters are not as irresponsible as someone might assume.  The crew stopped what they were doing and started to retreat as soon as they realized they were in danger.  Granted they were in danger because the fire got below them, but if they were properly staffed they would have someone available to monitor the fire.  Because they were understaffed, the crew were unable to see the fire below them, so the crew left the fire at the right time considering they did not know the fire was below them.

Although the firefighters should have been aware of the fire’s location, it is no surprise that it went unnoticed.  The crew was only staffed to work the beginning stages of a fire, not a fire that was four days strong and over hundreds of acres. The team needed a trained aerial observer instead of relying on Dick Good..  Even though the firefighters should have known the fire was below them, they left when they realized they were in danger, which in the end saved more than half of the crew.  If the team was properly staffed with an aerial observer and enough people to fight the fire, then the disaster would be avoided.

Works Cited

Maclean, John. Fire on the Mountain. 1st ed. New York: William Morrow, 1999. 21-144. Print.