SPLA Defectors: the ‘Trojan Horse’ Plan

Redeployment of badly kept secrets of "trojan horses"

SPLA Defectors: the ‘Trojan Horse’ Plan

By Opoka Christopher Arop

As the recent talks in Addis Ababa have yielded less and less, and plunged the warring parties back to the drawing table of battle plans and eminent outburst of gross human rights violations; I thought looking back in the history of the SPLA, of which both warring parties are a part, would reveal what we may expect and indeed get, if recent defections and counter defections are to be considered.

In December 1997 and January 1998, a dramatic new element was added to the armed presence in Wau. Hundreds of mostly Dinka SPLA soldiers began defecting to the government side, bringing with them their wives and children from the rural areas controlled by the SPLA around Wau. They surrendered to Kerubino, and took up residence near his headquarters in Marial Bai. The influx of SPLA soldiers to Kerubino’s forces started shortly after December 25, 1997, according to press accounts. One SPLA source said that two SPLA brigades (each of 600 men) “surrendered” to join the Kerubino forces.

Somewhat alarmed by the unannounced appearance of surrendering rebels, First Vice President Al Zubeir Mohamed Salih soon visited them. He announced they would be absorbed into the government’s armed forces. Whether former rebels would be permitted their own military organization or would be absorbed into the government army has always been a difficult issue: in settlement of the first civil war, units of Anyanya fighters were absorbed, under command of Anyanya officers, into the Sudan army.

The defections from the SPLA to Kerubino’s pro-government forces were announced with great fanfare by the government on national television, with celebrations of the SPLA surrendering in Marial Bai videotaped and broadcast. It seemed as if, little by little, the efforts to attract other defectors from the SPLA to the ‘peace from within’ program were bearing fruit, and the SPLA would be reduced to a shadow of itself. Efforts were announced to assist the needy returnees. By mid-January they included an estimated 2,500 SPLA fighters and 6,000 family members, called returnees.

It became easy to come and go from Wau, a change from the tight restrictions on movement put in place in May 1997 after Tonj fell to the SPLA. The defectors, who had surrendered but had not given up their guns, moved freely in and out of Wau with their arms. This frightened many northerners in Wau. The government authorities were suspicious, particularly when Kerubino provided government weapons to the defectors.

As it turned out, these defectors were part of a ‘Trojan Horse’ plan by Kerubino and the SPLA, whereby they would infiltrate SPLA forces into Wau and then capture the town with a surprise attack from within. According to SPLA Alternate Commander Marial Chanuong Yol, who participated in the affair, Kerubino contacted the SPLA by radio in August 1997, but the SPLA was wary because his forces were still fighting against the SPLA. In November 1998 a secret meeting between officers of both sides took place and a second meeting was held one month later, which this witness attended. Since the presence of SPLA troops near Kerubino’s base at Marial Bai could not be kept secret, this commander and his men posed as defectors from the SPLA. There Kerubino told them he had three enemies: the NIF, Riek Machar, and the SPLA. He could no longer work with the others but felt he could work with the SPLA.

Kerubino also was garnering other forces in the Wau area. In late 1997 or early 1998 Kerubino is reported to have supplied weapons to the Balanda in the Fertit militia, and they reportedly joined the Kerubino forces.

I have borrowed extensively from the 1999 Human Rights Report on Sudan to elucidate my point, that our history of violence is so opaque and repetitive that the current likely phases of “Trojan Horses” are rather preemptive. Because, we have always lived in cycles of “Trojan Horse” and without learning anything from every attempt; I am convinced that our brand of defectors today will only increase the anticipated bloodshed in the country.

Borrowing from the ‘supposedly’ leaked different versions of the African Union Commission of Inquiry report on South Sudan’s human rights violations, the ground is ever more than fertile for ‘Trojan Horses’.

Many interviewed by the Commission focused on the trigger that sparked the violence in the army headquarters on the evening of the 15^th stated that there were three different explanations: a coup attempt by the opposition, an attempt to disarm Nuer soldiers, and an attempt by Nuer soldiers to break into the armory.

The editor of Juba Monitor, one of two non-government dailies in Juba, told the Commission that the head of the Presidential Guard, tried to disarm Nuer soldiers Major General Marial Chanuong Yol Mangok, the commander of the Presidential Guard, otherwise known as the Tiger Battalion, discounted this as “false information,” explaining: “people not on duty leave their arms in the armory, only those on duty carry arms.”

General James Hoth Mai concurred: “We do not allow soldiers to go to sleep with their guns. There was no attempt to disarm anyone” He went on to tell the Commission: “We had 2 colleagues on duty that day. People mobilized to break the armory. There was no attempt to keep a particular group from being on duty that night. The Commander, a Nuer, killed his deputy, a Dinka, who was refusing for the armory to be opened. That same night, people came and broke open the armory.”

This account is consistent with that of the commander of the Presidential Guard. Furthermore, both contradict the claim by President Kiir on December 17 that there had been a coup attempt. Maj. Gen Marial Chanuong Yol Mangok told the Commission: “I reported a mutiny in my garrison. When the shooting spread beyond my garrison to town, I could not give it a name.” The then Director of Military Intelligence, Maj. Gen. Mac Paul, shed further light on this in his remarks to the Commission: “Breaking into the armory was a response to rumors. Nuer mobilization began when the killing began on the 17^th and 18^th.”

The Commission asked the Editor of Juba Monitor: What happened on 15 December? His response: “My office is not very far from where the President stays, and where Riek stayed. Each would bring people from his own tribe as Presidential Guard protectors of President and Vice President. On the 16^th, the army came in and pounded Riek’s house which had 15 or so guards. They came with tanks, destroyed the place completely, and killed all guards. They also destroyed the house of Gier Chuang Aluong, one of the G11. The President spoke in his fatigue on the 16^th. My reporter saw three vehicles full of dead bodies from the hospital, being taken somewhere. The government wants no negative reporting. A month later, I wrote that atrocities had been committed in Juba, and gave this as an example. I also wrote that people of Gudele say that lots of Nuer killed in Gudele, thousands. I was summoned by security. My telephone was tapped for talking to Alfred Lado Gore, Riek’s deputy.”

The Commission asked the same question of General Andrew Kuol, Deputy Inspector General of Police. His response confirms the account painted by civilians of Juba under siege those three days, December 16 to 18, by an armed mob: “The army went on a rampage. Three quarters of the army stay in residences in Juba. When the army controls a situation, it becomes very difficult for the police to step in. We buried 50-60 people in one place. We have formed a committee to investigate into the killings �" there is a report with the IGP.”

Major General Mac Paul, then the Director of Military Intelligence, told the Commission that 38 died on the side of government and 59 on the other in the fighting in the barracks on the 15^th: “On the 16^th, there was another shootout. These people were defeated at 2 p.m. They lost 22 in that random shooting; seven members of a civilian family were also killed by a shell falling on their house. This was after the President’s address on the 16 The President’s address re-triggered the shooting in the barracks. I was in the office, and could not hear any counter-fire �" only random shooting for 20 minutes, fighting within government troops in response to a rumor that an attack was coming. I could hear all weapons, even tanks.”

The facts are clear. Many of these names, who may have not chosen sides during the negotiations with glimpses of a peace agreement, now find themselves with difficult choices. They will have to choose and choose quickly, though not wisely. Either decision places them as culpable instruments in the “Trojan Horse” games of war.

The idea that many Nuer commanders who backed President Kiir may be reexamining their positions is as real a time bomb as is the fate of Dinka who will defect from the rebel side upon accusing Riek of focusing narrowly on a Nuer revenge mission. Whatever the cards played, all “Trojan Horses” carry with them a distinct smell of death.