(2012) North Korea Nuclear Proliferation - A constructivist View

A unique perspective on North Korea rationale behind its Nuclear Program, written 5 years ago. I would still argue, many of the arguments are still valid, while the political stage has evolved since.

A unique perspective on North Korea rationale behind its Nuclear PRogram

"Since the post �" Cold War period, North Korea has pursued developing its own nuclear program as a part of its military strategy. Disregarding the various debates around this issue, how can one assess the intentions of the North Korean regime.  Many scholars support different theories when approaching the North Korean nuclear dilemma. However,  there are always assumptions being made that need to be noted in order to facilitate a better understanding of the situation that is yet unfolding. It is clear that North Korea developed its Nuclear Program as a result of wanting to improve its security and diplomatic leverage over the international community.  Nevertheless the ways in which the DPRK has evolved its use its nuclear program from a form of deterrence to receiving aid, offers a different perspective from the conventional form. This essay offers two sets of arguments: one theoretical and one analytical. I will be using the theory of constructivism to illustrate that North Koreas cultural norms and identity offer a different outlook of their regimes intentions pertaining its nuclear program. It will also become evident that there have been several factors that have led to the shift in how North Korea has used its nuclear weapons as leverage over the international community in efforts to pursue its national interests.

This essay is sectioned into four parts to facilitate the development of my main argument: North Korea behaviour is constructed and can offer a different perspective when assessing the intentions of their regime in its pursuit to develop nuclear weapons.  Part I introduces the theory of constructivism associated in the security dilemma,  it will briefly analyze how identity and changing norms can be used to interpret the DPRK military intentions. Part II will contextualize the development of the North Koreas nuclear program by giving a historical background of key events and factors associated with the DPRK use of its nuclear program. After reviewing how North Korea has developed its nuclear program, part III will provide a overview of some of the literature pertaining to different models in attempt to explain why states pursue nuclear weaponry. It will become clearer that there are several models that can be applied to the North Korea. There is an apparent change in the identity of North Korea, which can be witnessed through its interaction with the international community. Part IV, provides a analysis of North Koreas nuclear program and how a identity, can offer a different perspective into North Korea intentions regarding its nuclear program.

Part 1 - Constructivism

            The security dilemma revolves around the paradigm of fear and uncertainty, where states act accordingly to other states actions or perceived intentions.  The DPRKs action to pursue its nuclear program since the debut of the Cold War has roused the attention of the international community. It has become a centered focus in the security dilemma as scholars attempt to predict their intentions.  Peter Katzenstein contends that mainstream theories such as neorealism and neoliberalism cannot adequately explain the security interest of states anymore (Katzenstein, 1996).  What Katzenstein means is that the actual military capabilities of a state is becoming less important, rather norms affecting the identity of the state have emerged as a more reputable understand of the states intentions.  Aspects of national interest that have been constructed that will be analyzed are: unification, regime survival, self- sufficiency, culte and colelctive identity. 

            The idea of national interest being constructed has been used to explain a states military strategy.  North Koreas military strategy has centered on the ideology of unification and state nationalism. It has perceived for the past half century that the DPRK main goal is to unify the North and South Korea into one political unit. They see the encroachment of the U.S. military presence in South Korea as a form of imperialism and thus one of the main deterrents to unification. It must be noted that in terms of defense, the DPRK includes South Korea. The concept of defense in North Korea embodies the whole geographical location of the Korean Peninsula (Hodge, 2003:70). The concept of national unification and its factor into justifying the proliferation of the nuclear program have been noted by several scholars (Hodge, 2003; Heckler, ;Hymans, 2008). This factor however has dissipated as one of the reasons to develop nuclear weapons, rather it has shifted to regime survival.

The concept of regime survival has been used to justify the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This ideology has been a result external influence. The DPRK’s national interest has been constructed since its influences by the Soviet Union. An example of this has been its response to the Korean resistance to Japanese colonialism or the Korean experience in the Chinese civil war (Hodge, 2003: 73). More recently, it has been influenced by China, in response to fending off the unilateral pressures of the United States. These occurrences have left an imprint on the way North Korea perceives itself, in which it believes it may be absorbed by either economic or military factors. Supplementary, the intrusion of military capabilities as the main factor promoting regime survival or also known as its main national interests is best seen in the changes that occurred to the leadership roles in the country.  In 1998, this “military first” strategy witnessed the rise of the Chairman �" commander of the army - and the abolishment of the post-of state President (Hodge,2003: 72). This institutional shift in the government operation has been constructed through a shift in evaluative standards. The shift in norms and values have been evidently placed in favour of a military regime, where it was been perceived that the DPRK has to fend off for itself.  Since then this constructed national interest has been influenced by a perceived notion of self-reliance.

            The concept of self-reliance in the DPRK is sustained through its national interest to seek unification with the South. The term Juche (self- reliance) is a prime example of this concept, where it embodies a re-orientation of the economy to that which supports domestic production and consumption. Marcus Noland contends that Kim Jong Il’s regime appears to be successful at integrating juche ideology into Korean nationalism (Noland, 1997: 106). Juche embodies the concept of national pride, that is, becoming self-reliant and avoiding the economic interactions with major powers was perceived to result in being less influenced by western ideologies.  An example of self-reliance related to North Koreas Nuclear program is seen in its detachment from Soviet Union aid.  By the 1970s North Korea was self reliant to develop its own nuclear program, and rejected the restrictions imposed from the Soviet Union to develop its Nuclear Program (joining the nuclear non-proliferation pact) (Hecker, 2010) Juche is a concept that was constructed during the Kim Jong Il’s regime, it prevented the integration of the North Korean economy into the globalized markets, as well as increased the cultural perception of remaining self-reliant. Al though this is discredited by the DPRK reliance on foreign aid, it is perceived from them that they are receiving this aid as a result of leverage that they have constructed, for instance, the bomb.

            Identity through the past North Korean leaders can be summed up through a shared norms and actions in the international arena. As state above, the DPRK has pursued a military path that has been engraved in its cultural identity since the post �" WWII period.  This cultural norm has been past on through the past leaders. Homer T. Hodge supports the fact that Militarism has remained an essential aspect of the North Korea state since its founding; this thinking has been inculcalated into the thinking of Kim’s Son (Hodge, 2003:72). Furthermore, this identity that has been constructed through transpiration of norms has also been witnessed in the international arena. Throughout negotiations with several major powers (U.S. and Russia), the DPRK has acted against agreements in support of their own objectives.  It has become a norm where the DPRK will use their nuclear weapon as a form of diplomatic sway, to obtain investments into their infrastructure or humanitarian aid, but will then continue their nuclear program against the will of the international community. Examples of how the DPRK has constructed their identity throughout the development of their nuclear program will be assessed in the following section. It will become apparent that, while there are many uncertainties surrounding North Korea’s military intentions, that their constructed identity is more telling than their weapon capabilities itself.  

Part II - Background

The historical background of North Koreas nuclear program can be summed up, in its interaction with the United States.  The reasoning justifying North Koreas nuclear program has since its development was a result of wanting increased political power in an international community that discredited its legitimacy.  Kim il �" Sung, North Koreas founding father lead the foundation for development nuclear technologies in the early 1950s as a result of the Soviet “atoms for peace” (Hecker, 2010). During this process, many North Korean students were able to become educated in nuclear technologies in Russian sponsored facilities.  By the 1970s North Korea was self-reliant to develop its own nukes, and refused the inspections of its facilities as it had no obligations to do so, as it was not a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (Hecker, 2010).  Heckers’ argument that North Korea was self-reliant to develop its own nuclear program is a slight misconception as it did not have the infrastructure to support its development �" particularly the energy demand. As a result of needing to produce more energy, North Korea signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in December 1985, due to Soviet influences to help build water reactors (Sigal, insert year: 5). Al though North Korea signed this agreement, it did not stay true to its commitments and continued to develop its nuclear program. The United States withdrew all of its nuclear warheads from the Korean peninsula in an effort to please the International community; in doing so North Korea signed an agreement with South Korea on Decemeber 31st, 1991, agreeing to sustain a nuclear-free peninsular, but once again failed to carry through with this promise (Sigal, insert year: 5). The lack of following through with commitments altered the perceived identity of the North Korea state and resulted in various sanctions.

North Korea is a land of unknowns and uncertainties, where the international community rarely knew what was going on within the DPRK. In 1992, Pyongyang opened back its nuclear program under the rules of the IAEA, but quickly closed it when the inspectors had found discrepancies between the measurements that had been suggested and what was found (Hecker, 2010). It soon after closed off its nuclear program to inspection, which spurred on more attempts to negotiation, before signing the Agreed Framework, the interactions between North Korea and the United States was quite a failure.  North Korea understood that the Americans would not want to wage war, especially since they assumed they had weapons of mass destruction, thus threats of warfare were not well received.  The only negotiations that appeared to be successful were through President Bill Clinton that agreed to normalize political and economic relations in return for a halt in the Nuclear Program (Sigal,:9). However, once the DPRK received what it needed, in this particular case, when it did not, it continued its nuclear program.  Negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea failed to substantiate and often resulted in a worsening of relationship.  This relationship was however decisively altered through the Agreed Framework.

After removing fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactors in May 1994, the United Nations Security Council adhered and formulated sanctions; with the sanctions nearly in place, President Jimmy Carter went to Pyongyang and agreed on signing the Agreed Framework (AF) (Sigal, :6).  The AF essential halted the nuclear program and provided the DPRK with security reassurance.  Following this agreement, Siegfried Hecker contends that the DPRK continued to expand its missile program, including launching long-range rockets over Japan in 1998 (Hecker, 2010).  After realizing this, the Bush Administration had confronted the North Korea, however, the DPRK had no will to agree to the American pressures. They had thought that the American War on Terror in Iraq, would soon be an excuse to invade their territory. The official break from the treaty was made apparent when North Korea became the first country to withdraw from the NPT on the 10th of January 2003 (Pollack, 2003:11).  This retreat from this agreement signified to the rest of the world, that North Korea was in fact a potential threat. It had openly removed itself from a institution that all nuclear states had signed on to.  By this time it was apparent through U.S. intelligence that North Korea had undertaken a covert uranium-enrichment program that was directly against the Agreed Framework (Polack, 2003:13; Heckler, 2010).  The fact that the DPRK kept hidden their mal intentions has detrimentally affected their identity, where they have become less trustworthy, thus affecting the future negotiations.

Following Kim Jong-il departure from the Agreed Framework, the United States refused to negotiate with North Korea. However, despite such pessimism, the following trend of negotiations took place through a six party talks.  Through this process, the six nations: The United States, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, China and Russia meet and attempt to adopt a unified policy to address a resolution. The two resolutions supported in this group are the Ukraine and Lybian model (Park, 2005:80).  There is the United States and Japan on one side, and the others supporting the Ukraine Model on the other.  Both sides believed that there are particular factors that are or are not a variable in the North Korea case.   What Pyongyang wants from these negotiations is the upmost compensation(large-scale economic development assistance, diplomatic normalization and a security guarantee) for the removal of its nuclear arsenal, whereas the Lybian model only provided re-access to frozen assets in Europe and the United States (Park, 2005: 81).

Models in support of nuclear proliferation

North Koreas possessions of nuclear weapons have been justified through its ability to ‘protect’ its national interests. Mainly, it has used the WMD as a means of leverage in the international community.  It is without doubt that the international community wants to disarm the DPRK as many see this state as being prone proliferating nuclear technologies, which may end up in the wrong hands. The International Community and mainly the U.S. have attempted to prevent arms from developing in North Korea, but it is justifiable?  Do states have the right to nuclear weapons? Approaching this paradigm, it must first be analyzed on the potential benefits associated with nuclear capabilities and second, whether or not it is applicable to North Korea.

States pursuing a nuclear program do so for many reasons, some of which cannot be fully analyzed, due to a lack of information.  It has become a prominent debate that the reasons why states go nuclear surround the notion of security. Scott Sagan argues that this conventional view is dangerously inadequate and other models should be adopted to better understand why states pursue nuclear ambitions (Sagan, 1997:54). Sagan proposes three different models for understanding the desire to invest in a nuclear program: One, the ‘security model’; secondly, ‘domestic politics model’ and third, the ‘norm model’ (Sagan, 1997).

The security model applies to states seeking security by issuing the potential threat of nuclear warfare. Sagan contends that weaker states do what they must to protect their state, which may mean using nuclear weapons as a form of deterrence.  This has been particularly true to North Korea, where the fear of U.S. invasion have been at a root of speculations for developing their nuclear program (Hodge, 2003;69).  The North Korean government may see the U.S. war on terror in Iraq as a potential foreshadowing of what may come to them.  This has been particularly expressed through the Bush administration’s approach to the war on terrorism where they termed North Korea as being “axis of evil” (Cha, 2002:79). It can be assumed without further speculation that there was potential outbreak of war, and that this security model may have been used to protect its states security.   This model can be used to justify the reasoning of the DPRK to develop its nuclear program, but it is far from being a sufficient analysis.

The domestic model is applied in the context where a state actors use to their fullest ability to develop a nuclear arsenal despite national security issues. Sagan contends that state actors will use the notion of state security as a concept to promote nuclear proliferation, with other intentions (Sagan, 1997: 65). While the excuse of state security should not be ignored as a means of development, it is interesting to peek into some of the domestic factors that led to the development of the nuclear program in the DPRK.  For most of the 20th century, security issues dominated the reasoning for nuclear ambitions. However, as the potential for warfare dissipated with the advancement of the nuclear program, it became evident that the DPRK leadership was using the development of its nuclear program as a means of leverage in the international community. As a result of several negotiations, the DPRK received investment into infrastructure, food and sanitation and energy needs (Soon-Young, 1999). In addition to these forms of aid, there has been a bureaucratic push in the domestic politics in the DPRK to use the nuclear program as a leverage to normalize diplomatic relations (Park, 2005: 81; Snyder, 1997:67). The domestic model offers a different perspective when assessing the intentions of DPRK, it has illustrated how domestic actors have utilized the nuclear program for pushing forth other benefits.  This potential factor may be used to understand other intentions of the DPRK and its use of its nuclear weapons, beyond the means of military deterrence.  If the domestic model is applied, other incentives have risen as a result of possessing nukes, while using U.S. threat as a reason for development; the DPRK may have switched its motives into pushing forth infrastructural development as a means of compensation for discontinuing its nuclear program. The domestic model offers a new perspective, diverging away from the conventional model of security, the norms model presents a perception as well.

States that possess nuclear capabilities natural obtain a higher sense of prestige over those that do not.  Sagan reports that according to this perspective “state behaviour is determined not be leader’s cold calculations about the national security interest or their parochial bureaucratic interests, but rather by deeper norms and shared beliefs about what actions are legitimate and appropriate in international relations” (Sagan, 1997: 73). This perspective may be used to explain the one of the reasons why North Korea sought to develop in Nuclear Arsenal. From a constructivist viewpoint, the DPRK can only seek legitimacy as a state from external actors. The development of nuclear weapons legitimizes North Korea as a viable threat to international security, but also into the exclusive club of countries that have nuclear capabilities. As stated above, North Korea seeks unification of the Korean peninsula as its main national interests, possessing nukes gives it added legitimacy to do so, either through institutional or military legitimacy. 

            It should be clear that the conventional reasoning for supporting a nuclear program is largely inadequate. The proposed three models offer a new perspective into justification of the DPRK and development of its nuclear program.  In the security model it is clear that security was a main motive for the initial development of its nuclear program, but this model cannot be used to justify its continued existence. The reason why I cannot be used anymore is because the threat of war has been diminishing over time, and as a result, other factors must be introduced to attempt to justify the reasoning for the continued development of the North Korean nuclear program. The domestic model is useful as it illustrates how state actors have re-shaped the usage of its nuclear program, from a security issue, it has become a tool as leverage to promote infrastructural development, as hoped for in the Agreed Framework and to increase humanitarian aid to its people suffering from famines. Through this perspective it is becoming more clear that the North Korean nuclear “threat”, is slowly diminishing, but that they are willing to use this program to further its national interests;  the norms model offers an extension of this theory. The DPRK seeks legitimacy, one of its main national interests is to seek unification. One of these factors that may have been associated with seeking unification is promoting its prestige as a modern state and military power through its nuclear program. This change in attitude offers a potential criticism that North Koreas identity through the shifts in how it has used its nuclear program as leverage in diplomatic negotiation. Through this process applying a constructivist view of how North Koreas identity is perceived can give us more information on their intentions rather than observing their military capabilities.  Their intentions may be more aligned to negotiating dissolution of their nuclear program, but it must also be approached with high levels of concern, as it has become a norm that they will neglect agreements in pursuit of their national interests.

Part IV - Analysis 

            North Koreas initial pursuit of its nuclear weapons was a direct response to rising U.S. pressures in their region. Following the post-WWII period, North Korea was faced with the strain to adhere to American policies that entailed militarizing of its region. Rejecting this notion was at the core of its national interests.  Instead of being influenced by external factors, North Koreas believed it was in their best interest to adopt a military first approach. This approach was used to justify the attempt to secure its national interests from potential invading aggressors, namely the United States.  Through this approach it adopted a mainly offensive character which can be demonstrated by the organization and deployment of its military forces (KPA) (Hodge, 2003:74).  This emphasis a strong military and pursuit of its national interest was strengthened with the evolution of the Cold War.

            During the Post-WWII, North Korea had rejected the United States as a model of politics and governance, instead the DPRK looked towards the Soviet Union and China.  This was particularly true pertaining to the development of the DPRKs nuclear program which received a lot of support from the Soviets.  However, during the Cold War, North Koreas perception of its ‘role models’ changed, instead the DRPK pushed forth to become self-reliant. For instance, the outcome of the Cuban missile crisis unfolded in a manner that shed doubt on Soviet commitments to its Allies as witnessed in the Sino-Soviet Split (Hecker, insert year: 48).  This re-enforced both the urgency to increase its military strength and to remain as less reliant on external forces as possible.  This inward form of development was prominent at the time, especially in the region. Likely being influenced from Chinese modes of development(commune systems), North Korea pursued an economic path that attempted to promote sustainable growth, sans the influences of foreign states.

            The efforts to remain self-reliant were done through the concept Juche.  Bruce Cummings Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History re-emphasises the factors that have promoted the sentiments engraved in the concept of Juche, that is, regarding the region of Korea as a place with high amounts of self-respect (Cummings, 1997). This concept was at the foundation of Juche where it focused on ‘korea first’ politics which entailed import substitution industrialization as well as a strong military. This form of collectivism was apparent in its economic landscape that involved collective land and production ownership (Alfonzo, 2010:217). While its not in this essays interest to analyse the roles of economic development that may have limited the capacity of North Korea to integrate into the world economy. Its important to note that despite influences from across the border, and states that surrounded it, it avoided the penetration of globalization, in hopes of raising its own economy. But like many countries that have tried this, they have tended to fail (Singapore and Taiwan as the exceptions). What this means to this essay, is that despite the ease of entering the global market, it restricted such advancements to gain control of its own development. These attributes of pride and respect can also be used as a potential justification of pursuing its nuclear program.

The political identity associated with pride and respect may also be used while following a normative model into explaining why the DPRK pursued its nuclear program. It is evident that there are certain levels of prestige and benefits associated with possessing nuclear weapons. Therefore it may be plausible that North Koreas constructed identity -pride and respect- can be used to interpret a potential reason to their development of their nuclear program.  It became less obvious that fact that the DPRK had pursued its nuclear program in pursuit of higher amounts of security shifted after the United States withdrew its nuclear weapons from South Korea.

- Dillon Sookbir