On Knowledge And Justification

Questioning the current philosophical definition of 'knowledge'. (Note: This is not a story, no other category fits well enough for Philosophical writings)

  Note: This "issue" has, in my mind, been fixed. However, instead of rewriting history and erasing this work I'm just going to add a solution to the bottom. Please keep this in mind when reading. 

     We know things. For example, I know that I exist. I know that I hate the color yellow. But what is knowledge? In philosophical terms, knowledge is defined as 'a justified, true belief.' For example, if Gary can see that his house is on fire and believes it, then his belief is true and is justified by his witnessing the fire. Gary knows that his house is on fire. If Gary were in Antarctica however, and suddenly found himself believing that his house was on fire he would have no justification. Gary does not know his house is on fire, even if it really is.

   What's my point? Justification. There has to be justification in order for there to be knowledge, assuming of course that the current definition is, in fact, true. This brings forth a problem in the form of internal, intagible opinions and qualities. I hate the color yellow. This is most certainly true... but what is the justification for my belief that I hate yellow? I believe it, but why? Without reason I cannot be said to know my opinion on the color, as absurd as that seems.

   How can we resolve this conundrum? The first impulse is to look for external confirmation... what behaviors or attitudes do I adopt when confronted with the color yellow? From such observations I could most surely arrive at evidence of apprehension, justifying my belief. But is this not equally absurd, that we cannot know our own opinions until we seek to manifest them physically? Surely there must be a way to internally justify such beliefs, and thus know them.

   Perhaps by virtue of my believing something it becomes rational. I believe that a cheese-filled rabbit is controlling my thought processes from a control room on Neptune, and that is an utterly rational belief. But is it? I would think not... without logic and reason absolutely anything becomes a rationally honored belief, which can only wreak havoc upon philosophical and theological advancement, not to mention the entirety of social interaction. To further demonstrate the insanity of this, let's suppose a man brutally murders another in the middle of the street. His 'justification' is that he believed the man to be an alien warlord hellbent on sinking North America. Would you honor this clearly dubious belief as being 'rational'? Of course not, so allowing such beliefs to be rationally justified by virtue of themselves must be dismissed as fallacy.

   We are left with three conclusions at this juncture:

1) We cannot actually know any of our own internal opinions without first justifying it via an observed, external presentation of our attitudes.

2) Every belief is rationally justified by virtue of it being a belief.

3) The current definition of Knowledge is flawed in some way.

   I reject conclusion 1 due to it being absolutely absurd. If we were to seperate my mind from all else, it could still formulate and know its own opinions despite being segregated from sensation and external reality. I also reject conclusion 2 as being the inverse of conclusion 1... it allows far too much to be justified in the absence of rational thought. I must then conclude that the definition of knowledge is currently insufficient to cover our philosophical needs.

   I believe that some sort of 'Internal Justification Thesis' is needed to complete Knowledge, though at this moment I find myself unsure as to what that thesis may be.

 

The "Solution": I'm not sure what I was thinking when I wrote this, but the problem is quite an easy one to solve. Conclusion #2 is the correct one, in that you are rationally justified in knowing that you hold a belief but the belief itself is not justified in this manner. To illustrate:

1) Bill believes that "the moon is really an alligator in disguise".
2) It is true that Bill believes that "the moon is really an alligator in disguise".
3) It is not true that "the moon is really an alligator in disguise".

4) Therefore, Bill knows that he believes that "the moon is really an alligator in disguise", but Bill does not know that "the moon is really an alligator in disguise" because that is an untrue statement.

Do you see the distinction? His knowledge only applies to his state of believing, he knows what he believes, but this does not mean that he actually knows the statements expressed in his beliefs, so his beliefs can still be incorrect.

Author's Note

Excuse the structure, I was musing upon this issue yesterday on a long drive and this is the first time putting it to print.

Reviews

[Ego Amo]

really enjoyed reading this; a few thoughts--

your aversion for the color is not perceived, but experienced.

knowledge, then, may be justified by perception (3rd person knowledge) -or- experience (1st person knowledge)

the former type may be conveyed to others by giving evidence, while the latter type can never be externally justified (I can never /know/ how you feel about the color yellow, but both Bill and I can watch his house burn to the ground)

[ICE]

Heh you and your philosophical rants :)

[Shane William]

I think, what your really talking about here is perception. Justification is the act of determining what is just, or what is the truth, which is, for the most part, guided by our reason and perception. I tend to think of justification and knowledge on a more personal level. Your knowledge is your own, it's one of your defining traits as a human being. And also, your knowledge itself is irrelevant to 'truth' in it's deepest definition. I rather propose the argument for truth.
Here, if you don't mind, check out a short simple writing on perception and truth that I wrote. I suppose it's also sort of an argument on god too but don't let that deter you :)

http://www.writerscafe.org/writing/Neploid/462537/