An Intelligence Report

An intelligence report from an Agent of Dublin Castle in 1920 Ireland.

An Analysis of the Tactics and Weapons Deployed by the Irish Volunteers, Irish Citizen’s Army, and other Irish Paramilitary Organizations in the current Civil Strife.

By: Agent John Lynch, Dublin Castle Authority

Since the dawn of English authority over Ireland, we have had to deal with the emergence of rebellion after rebellion. Each time we have dealt with the issue and put down hostile forces allied against us with ease. They fought as an army. The issue now at hand is not the same as it has been in the past. We are not fighting the forces of a standing army, but the soldiers of a force whose tactics and goals allow them to strike from the shadows, bypass army patrols, and otherwise cause havoc.

As such, we cannot rely on the abilities developed on our own part from past engagements. However; before we are able to redevelop and train ourselves, we must examine what has been laid out by the hostile forces. The major points of contacts we must cover are as follows: Intelligence, Weapons, Tactics, and an evaluation of their long-term goals based upon mounting actions.

I. Intelligence

A. The paramilitary organizations in questions have somehow, whether through direct actions, the extortion of information, or moles within our organization, acquired information pertaining to the identities of both our agents and informants. With this information, they have started a series of assassinations and threats to effectively blind us from following their movements.

1. Before moving forward with any operations, we must hold all secure briefings away from the castle, thus avoiding the possibility that I.R.B spies are watching and recording those who enter the Castle. These places must be pre-screened by Castle Authorities who are to be working with them. Each agent’s holdings are to be separate locations, so that the loss of security on one does not mean the loss of security for all.

2. Any agent who feels that he has been compromised is to immediately report as such via an agent by agent designation. (i.e. a red tie left on their work desk, etc.) All married agents are to report with their families and all personal effects so that the Castle may ensure their security from Irish Republican murder gangs.

B. The ability of paramilitary organizations to run their agents through our lines, bypassing military recourse. Freely allowing these groups to gun run, curie messages, and move hit squads into otherwise secure areas.

1. While we cannot stop the passage of information, weapons, or troops with conventional checkpoints, we must increase the frequency of checkpoints and expand the forces at each. This is not for the purpose of increasing the chances of success, but rather to increase the difficulty of passing information. Every measure must be taken to the extreme in order to force couriers off roads, through back country, and otherwise slow the progress of their lines.

2. Pioneering army units must be deployed into the rural countries, lightly geared so as to clear them from the possibility of entrapment, to hunt down any spies or couriers whom they come across. The more intelligence we are able to capture, decode, and use, the better we will be able to overcome hostile forces.

C. Propaganda, speeches, and other persuasive tools instituted by the Irish republicans are used to exploit lapses in British judgments, underline the slightest errors and blow them out of proportion.

1. The subversive content of I.R. propaganda must be countered through our own efforts. These must be able to stir imperial pride, reach out to their sense of belonging in the British Empire. Alongside such examples, we must also start a campaign to enlist more men into the army. For although the Great War has ended, the more young, strong Irishmen whom show pride in the uniform, the less of them will be joining in arms with the Republicans.

II. Weapons

A. Bombs, Improvised Explosives, and Fire-Based Weapons: A favorite tool of insurgents in the Irish Republican organizations are tools of fear, and structural destruction. On a special note, the Automobile Bomb, this is geared into the ignition of automobiles so as to detonate them upon their use.

1. The only measures which we can impart upon ourselves concerning the use of these weapons is to increase your awareness of their existence, and search thoroughly for their presence in your surroundings before and important meeting is to take place, or before the use of automobiles.

B. Rifles and Pistols: Other than reconstituted army or Royal Irish Constabulary weapons, most service rifles engaged are hunting instruments. However, higher level officials of the I.R.B. can be expected to be protected by fully automatic military-grade assault weapons.

1. When encountered, stashes or remains of such weapons are to be processed and destroyed. The best way to allow us to overpower the republicans in combat is to deny them the same abilities as our soldiers concerning armament.

2. When in combat, awareness as to the capabilities of enemy armament is key. But more than this, the designation of enemy marksmen is of the upmost importance. What we can deny them more than their weapons are their men. They can steal, buy, or find as many rifles as they want but it takes time to recruit, train, and field a soldier. While any kill is to be commended, a skilled man’s death will disable and demoralize the enemy.

III. Tactics

A. The staple of the I.R. assaults is their swiftness. Troops are gunned down from crowds, assaulted in pubs, or pool halls, and generally caught off-guard.

1. The first step to disabling their route of attack is to fortify our standing positions. Secondly, we must maintain a greater level of security on patrols. Any suspicious activity is to be met with appropriate force.

2. Convoy units must be covered by vigilant troops and routed to avoid the use of tight roads, or other funneling environments.

3. Troops, while off-duty, are to report their locations for the evenings so that appropriate response teams will know the specific locations attacks are likely to occur. As well, troops and police off-duty are to remain armed with, at the least, their pistols.

IV. Long-Term Goals

A. Irish Republican forces have, over the course of several months, quickly advanced throughout rural areas. Their targets include, for the most part, military, R.I.C., and auxiliary barracks.

1. It is our current belief that the goals associated with these attacks are two-pronged. The first goal is the disablement and disallowance of quartering our troops in rural regions.

2. Secondly, these assaults are to capture the supplies hosted in such barracks. These are critical to the efforts of the Republicans due to the nature of weapons and food stored here. We must deny the enemy these things if we have any hope of overcoming their advantages.

B. Of course, the main and lasting goal of the I.R.B and I.R.A is the removal of Imperial authority over Ireland. This cannot be allowed to happen.

1. Should we be driven from Ireland by such a paltry force, we can expect that the colonial authorities will come under attack in other holdings. It doubtful that they will control the military strength of even the I.R.A, but it will be a costly process to bring them back under control. Still, the best way is to put down the rebellion, and better than losing a military battle, is to make the removal of Ireland seem a political move on the behalf of the English government.

These are the issues at hand. We must overcome and exploit these short comings to the best of our abilities. What we must do becomes more and more obvious each day: The training of special military units to deal with specific issues presented by the Republican forces. The befriending of civilians in rural and urban areas alike, we cannot hope to regain control of the whole of Ireland without martial law. Above all, we must insist upon victory, pressing at every chance presented, but not with abandon.

After these hostilities have concluded, we wish to remain allied to the people of Ireland, and as such, cannot destroy what we already have with them. The majority of the Irish do not feel harshly about us. We should not support any offence which would deepen the hatred of the republican traitors.