Is our everyday experience of life ideological/ Is culture always ideological?A Chapter by James HadesA brief essay on why every day of our lives is an illusion. Read lightly ;)Is culture always ideological? Ideology is an implicit element of
quotidian life, it is the irresistible driving force that defines the
individuals of all societies and this leads to the following point, that culture
is not a thing in itself it can rather be seen as a synonym of ‘ideology’. Ideology
is not to be defined as the conventional “set of beliefs and ideas that form a
category of language or language game, for example: the ideology of sports or
the human ideology” but rather it is to be defined, for the purpose of this
essay, as the following: “Ideology is a theoretical doctrine and activity which
erroneously regards ideas as autonomous and efficacious and which fails to
grasp the real conditions and characteristics of social-historical life”
(Thompson 1990:35) Thompson’s definition is one that clarifies the role of
ideology as a theoretical doctrine and this is important if we are to clarify
that culture and ideology are the same thing, in the sense that culture can
also be defined as Thompson’s definition of ideology, hence the definition of
ideology will more closely resemble culture and thus enable the reader to see
the close similarity between both concepts. Thinkers such as Adorno, Althusser,
Bourdieu, Marcuse, Marx and some critics will help shed light on how ‘ideology’
is in fact the same as ‘culture’ and how our current knowledge and experience
of culture leads us to thinking so. The use of the previously mentioned
thinkers will enable us to compare and analyse the different definitions of
ideology, to conclude which one emphasises the fact that culture is always
ideological. “In The German Ideology Marx and Engels thus employ the term ‘ideology’
in a polemical way. The views of the Young Hegelians are ‘ideological’ in the
sense that they overestimate the value and role of ideas in history and in
social life; they ‘consider conceptions, thoughts, ideas, in fact all products
of consciousness, to which they attribute an independent existence, as the real
chains of men” (Thompson 1990:34) The importance of Marx’s use and definition
of ideology, as highlighted in Thompson’s work, is that Marx uses ideology as a
critical tool to criticise the bourgeoisie hegemony and their creation of ideas
that lead the proletariat and lower classes to “attribute an independent
existence, as the real chains of men” to all the products of consciousness.
Marx’s use of ideology was originally used to criticise the thought of the
‘Young Hegelians’ but rapidly became a tool from “linking the production and
diffusion of ideas to the relation between classes” (Thompson 1990:37) This is
emphasised in Marx’s and Engels’ German
Ideology “The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling
ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material
force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force” (Marx 1845: 64) and Thompson’s following quote
“So we can speak of this as a conception of ideology
in Marx only on condition of recognizing that we are extending the term
‘ideology’ to refer to a range of social phenomena which Marx described without
naming, phenomena which he perceptively and disconcertingly portrayed in his
concrete analyses but which, at the level of theory, he did not subsume under a
discrete conceptual label” (Thompson 1990:41) Thompson’s quote arises an
important point that will enable the reader to understand the most fundamental
issue with the question of “is culture always ideological”. The quote is both
important to understanding ideology, but can also be its downfall, in the sense
that ideology has no concrete existence and cannot be pointed to, it is a
spectre that has manifestations in social and political realms of existence but
that cannot be named or wholly understood and this can be a problem. However,
for the time being Thompson’s quote will be used to advantage by emphasising
the fact that if ideology is not ‘subsumed’ under a conceptual label, it has
the possibility of being culture. At this point, Thompson’s following quote,
again, helps us greatly by highlighting the response to why culture is to be
understood as a ‘shape/spectre’ of ideology “The phenomena referred to by the
latent conception of ideology constitutes of symbols and slogans, customs and
traditions which move people or hold them back, propel them or constrain them,
in such a way that we cannot think of these symbolic constructions as solely
determined by, and fully explicable in terms of, the economic conditions of
production. These traditional symbols and values are not swept away once and
for all by the constant revolutionizing of production; they live on, they
modify and transform themselves” (Thompson 1990:41) The mentioning of tradition
and customs becomes a problem to the people who oppose the answer that culture
is always ideological, in the sense that if culture is not always ideological then it can no longer be defined as one’s
culture being made up of the past history of their ethical background in art and
social commodities. An additional quotation from Balibar can emphasise why this
definition of culture is no longer plausible “A social formation only
reproduces itself as a nation to the extent that, through a network of
apparatuses and daily practices, the individual is instituted as homo nationalis from cradle to grave, at
the same time as he/she is instituted as homo
oeconomicus, politicus, religiosus…” (Balibar 1990:350) Marx’s thoughts on the productions
of ideas and consciousness then play a key part in evoking how difficult it is
to show that culture is in fact not always
ideological, in the sense that “The production of ideas, of conceptions, of
consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and
the material intercourse of men, the language of real life” (Fromm 1967:20) The
problem with showing that culture is not ideological,
is in that consciousness can be defined as the products of socioeconomic
existence or for Marx, the ruling class’ propagated ideology and thus, culture
becomes a product of “the language of real life” which is just a by-product of
either socioeconomic existence or a by-product of the bourgeoisie. One may ask
what exactly is the problem
with the latter, and Althusser was a Post-Marxist and
reformulated Marx’s formulation of society in terms of socioeconomic classes
but with the addition of what he termed as Repressive State Apparatuses (R.S.A)
and Ideological State Apparatuses (I.S.A) as well as socioeconomic classes. The
R.S.A. contain “the Government, the Administration, the Army, the Police, the
Courts, the Prisons, etc..” (Althusser 2008:16) and the I.S.A contain “the
religious ISA, the educational ISA, the family ISA, the legal ISA, the
political ISA, the trade-union ISA, the communications ISA, the cultural ISA” (Althusser
2008:17) These state apparatuses concern the question of whether culture is
always ideological in the two following ways: firstly, if every institution in
society has been and is ideological, what remains in society for one to say
culture is not always ideological. Secondly, why culture is necessarily based
on the state and social institutions. We must remind ourselves that Althusser,
being a Post-Marxist, developed Gramsci’s original thoughts on the following
“Civil society is made up of ‘private’ institutions like the Church, trade
unions and schools, while the State is made up of public institutions like the
government, courts, police and the army” (Abercrombie 1980:13) Althusser’s
alteration of Gramsci’s thought is on the differing opinion that the State and
Civil Society are in fact the same thing, rather than Gramsci’s point of view
that states that they are separate structures. This is important because
Althusser’s rewording of Gramsci with his R.S.A. and I.S.A clarifies that even
if both State Apparatuses are in two different domain, they hold the necessary
connection of ideology, and this leads to strengthening the fact that culture
and society are always necessarily ideological, unless they ultimately erase
every institution but that would require starting the whole of social existence
from scratch. Furthermore, we cannot deny that
society as a whole is ideological, in the sense that with Althusser’s R.S.A and
I.S.A. one is unable to show that both are not
ideological without being counter productive and rejecting society as a
whole. We must again remind ourselves that Althusser’s theories take their
strength from Marx’s formulation of the negative propagating role of ideology,
in that these domains of State Apparatuses are not positive structures but
rather, negative structures that disable the living entities within society to
think outside the ideological spectrum of the Hegemony. The only objection one
may make to hold onto the opinion that culture is not always ideological is to arise the fact that according to
Gramsci’s formulation of the Hegemony, the latter “cannot be seen as a purely
ideological notion” (Abercrombie 1980:12) this is so because Gramsci carefully
points out that “obedience is not automatic but has to be produced”
(Abercrombie 1980:12) This entails that for culture to always be ideological,
there must always be obedience. However, this objection only holds power if the
individual denies Althusser’s R.S.A. and I.S.A. and Marx’s formulation of
ideology. This is because according to both those thinkers, and thinkers that
are to be mentioned further on in this essay, obedience and consent to
ideological hegemonic power is only possible if the whole of society and
culture is not always ideological,
but because we have shown it to be so far, it has become much harder to show
that consent and a being’s choice in society has not already become a construct
or by-product of the bourgeoisie or influenced by ideology. For the objection
to remain powerful, the objector must prove that one’s consent, while in a
socioeconomic realm of existence, is never influenced by social interactions
nor ideological institutions but because this is near to impossible, due to
Althusser’s theory of State Apparatuses and how they are the majority of social
structures, the objection does not hold much power. The following quote will
put a close on the objection’s problems and enable us to continue with Theodor
Adorno as well as some exemplifications in literature of the previously
mentioned theories and issues. “The command exercised by the ruling class over
the apparatus of intellectual production means that there cannot be any
subordinate culture, for all classes are incorporated within the same
intellectual universe, that of the ruling class” " “There is only one dominant
culture, in which all classes share” (Abercrombie 1980:8) With Marx’s formulation of ideology and Althusser’s
expression of State Apparatuses the only conclusion so far is that there are no
plausible or strong objections to deny that culture is not always ideological
and to further strengthen the point that culture is always ideological, we will
briefly analyse certain pieces of literature to show narratives that reproduce
this topic of cultural theory. “The striking unity of microcosm and macrocosm
presents men with a model of their culture: the false identity of the general
and the particular. Under monopoly all mass culture is identical, and the lines
of its artificial framework begin to show through. The people at the top are no
longer so interested in concealing
monopoly: as its violence becomes more open, so its power grows. Movies
and radio need no longer pretend to be art. The truth that they are just
business is made into an ideology in order to justify the rubbish they
deliberately produce. They call themselves industries; and when their
director’s incomes are published, any doubt about the social utility of the
finished products is removed.” (Adorno 1997:121) Adorno’s pessimistic sounding
but realistic approach to the issue of ‘is culture always ideological’ enables
us to further strengthen his mentioned points with the following literature
examples found in Fight Club and Althusser’s Ideology and the State. In Fight
Club, when Tyler sabotages the cinema by inserting pornographic pictures to
shock the audience in a subtle way “In reel three, just after the dog and cat,
who have human voices and talk to each other, have eaten out of a garbage can,
there’s the flash of an erection. Tyler does this.” (Palahniuk 2010:28) Tyler
believes he is sabotaging the culture industry but according to Adorno, “It is
quite correct that the power of the culture industry resides in its
identification with a manufactured need, and not in simple contrast to it, even
if this contrast were one of complete power and complete powerlessness.
Amusement under late capitalism is the prolongation of work” (Adorno 1997:126).
Tyler’s sabotaging is amusement, and is therefore prolonging his work for
capital. This exemplification of the question ‘is culture always ideological’
sheds light on the problem that when individuals think they might be escaping
the ideological system, it is in fact still there and they are paradoxically
still in the ideological system. This can only strengthen the fact that culture
is always ideological, in the sense
that one may try to deny this by claiming that if culture was always
ideological, why would an individual know of revolution and rebellion? Why
would one be taught about them as concepts if it only gives possibility to people
to revolt against the ideological system? Fight
Club as a novel and as a movie answers both those questions by evoking the
fact that revolution is just an illusion propagated by the hegemonic
bourgeoisie, and real life events such as the London riots in 2011 show that
revolution is always regulated by the R.S.A. . A more subtle example could be
the fact that teachers that teach critical theory or Marxism or Anti Capitalist
thought are the ones who go against the ideological system, yet the teach at
the apex of the hegemonic system, as they are part of the very Ideological
State Apparatus; Althusser mentions this example briefly “I ask the pardon of
those teachers who, in dreadful conditions, attempt to turn the few weapons
they can find in the history and learning they ‘teach’ against ideology, the
system and the practices in which they are trapped. So little do they suspect
it that their own devotion contributes to the maintenance and nourishment of
this ideological representation of the School” (Althusser 2008:31) These
literature examples and references, again, strengthen the fact that culture is
always ideological in the sense that everything from institutions to Art, are
carefully crafted modes of propaganda that enrich and serve the purpose of the
rich few, the hegemony. Following from this, the French thinker Bourdieu will help us
briefly answer why culture is always ideological from a more cultural point of
view in terms of taste, discourse and habits. The following quote from Bourdieu
explains that culture and taste is purposefully ideological and that culture
and taste’s only use in life is to stimulate a social class “Le gout classe, et
classe celui qui classe: les sujets sociaux se distinguent par les distinctions
qu’ils opèrent entre le beau et le laid, le distingué et le vulgaire, et ou
s’exprime ou se traduit leur position dans les classements objectifs.”
(Bourdieu 1979:VI) The latter evokes that life in a ideological culture has a
value system that it bases every action upon, and in this case, individuals are
judged by the aesthetics of their lives, whether they eat a lot or not, whether
they are good looking or not, whether they have class or not, and this in turn,
plays a bigger role in the appropriation of their class in society and because
social class is Marx’s and Althusser’s mentioned topics of debate, Bourdieu is
more or less reiterating Marx and Althusser in terms of social class and
culture always being ideological. Bourdieu more explicitly mentions culture as
a game of illusion in the following “Les jeux de culture sont protégés contre
l’objectivation par toutes les objectivations partielles auxquelles les agents
engagés dans le jeu se soumettent les uns les autres: les doctes ne peuvent
tenir la vérité des mondains qu’à même de leurs adversaires” (Bourdieu 1979:10)
To finalise Bourdieu’s thoughts, he mentions a problem that arose earlier in
this essay; the problem that individuals in a ideological realm of existence
hold actual personal beliefs that are not influenced by the ideological culture
that is around them. Bourdieu in fact strengthens the fact that it is near to
impossible to hold our own personal uninfluenced opinions when in such a system
“Le fait de produire une réponse à un questionnaire sur la politique, comme le
fait de voter ou, à un autre niveau de participation, de lire un journal
d’opinion ou d’adhérer à un parti, est un cas particulier de rencontre entre
une offre et une demande: le champ de production ideologique” (Bourdieu
1979:465) One may even furthermore add that Bourdieu’s reflections on how
society, culture and taste are measurable and usable in the industry can
perhaps mean that everything in culture is necessarily economic due to it’s
base structure “The forms of consciousness of human beings are determined by
the material conditions of their life” (Thompson 1990:35) However, this is not
the principal topic of debate in this essay. Furthermore, the following quote from Althusser will lead us
to continue on why culture is always ideological with the theories of Herbert
Marcuse “Ideology functions by moulding individuals as particular subjects and
placing them in the structure, while at the same time concealing from them
their role as agents of the structure. As such, ideology is necessarily an
illusory representation of the world. ‘In ideology, the real relation is
mentally invested in the imaginary relation, a relation that expresses a will…
a hope or a nostalgia, rather than describing a reality” (Althusser 1969: 235) From
this, Marcuse can strengthen the fact that culture is always ideological with
the following “One-dimensional thought is systematically promoted by the makers
of politics and their purveyors of mass information. Their universe of
discourse is populated by self-validating hypotheses which, incessantly and
monopolistically repeated, become hypnotic definitions or dictations” (Marcuse
2002:16) This reflects the fact that today, language is no longer a means to
communication but rather a means to create reality. Briefly adding to this,
Wittgenstein’s later works such as his philosophical investigations and private
language argument concretely showed that language created reality. Back to
Marcuse’s quotation and reminding ourselves of Wittgenstein’s works, we can
only certainly say that our knowledge of the definition of culture is forever
obstructed by ideology, for the sole reason that by writing this essay I live
in an ideological system and so have the past writers and thinkers and thus,
the way culture has been shown to be ideological might only be so because the
Ideological State Apparatuses of society have enabled it to be defined as such.
This is reinforced by Althusser’s I.S.A. list, with the fact that education is
filtered as an ideological structure. However, with this point raised, the most
plausible explanation for culture always being ideological are the points that
have been arisen so far and Marcuse will help strengthen this furthermore. The
key to concluding why culture is
always ideological is Marcuse’s following quote “Economic freedom would
mean freedom from the economy-from being controlled by economic forces and
relationships; freedom from the daily struggle for existence, from earning a
living. Political freedom would mean liberation of the individuals from
politics over which they have no effective control. Similarly, intellectual
freedom would mean the restoration of individual thought now absorbed by mass
communication and indoctrination, abolition of “public opinion” together with
its makers. The unrealistic sound of these propositions is indicative, not of
their utopian character, but of the strength of the forces which prevent their
realization” (Marcuse 2002:6) This quotation can reflect the impossibility of
culture not being ideological, in the
sense that if it were not then culture would not rely on social or economic
factors but many of culture’s definitions do, and those who do not have been
rendered problematic at the start of this essay. Concluding, this essay has repeatedly shown that the only
plausible explanation and definition for culture is Thompson’s, as mentioned in
the introduction, “Ideology is a theoretical doctrine and activity which
erroneously regards ideas as autonomous and efficacious and which fails to
grasp the real conditions and characteristics of social-historical life”
(Thompson 1990:35). The reason why this is the best plausible explanation is
because culture is in fact ideological, and has been shown to play the same
role as ideology; a doctrine that propagates either capitalism or false
consciousness, which in turn profits the ruling class. Additionally, Etienne
Balibar’s following quote will put an end to this essay by ultimately and
concretely explaining that culture is a nonsensical concept and is only just an
ideological construct - the answer to the question of is culture always
ideological is of course still the same regardless. “Every social community reproduced by the functioning of institutions is
imaginary, that is, it is based on the projection of individual existence
into the weft of a collective narrative, on the recognition of a common name and on traditions lived as the
trace of an immemorial past (even when they have been created and inculcated in
the recent past). But this comes down to accepting that, in certain conditions,
only imaginary communities are real…”
(Balibar 1990:357) Bibliography: - Thompson,
John (1990), Ideology and Modern Culture
(Great Britain: Blackwell Publishers) - Abercrombie,
N (1980) The dominant Ideology Thesis
(London: Billing and Sons Ltd.) - Marx,
Karl (1845) German Ideology
(International Publishers Co.) - Fromm,
Erich (1967) Marx’s Concept of Man
(New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co.) - Hindess,
Barry (1975) Pre-capitalist modes of
production (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul) - Adorno,
Theodor (1997) Dialectic of Enlightenment
(London: Verso Classics) - Palahniuk,
Chuck (2010) Fight Club (London:
Vintage Book Editions) - Marcuse,
Herbert (2002) One-Dimensional Man
(London: Routledge Classics) - Bourdieu,
Pierre (1979) La Distinction " Critique
sociale du jugement (Les editions de Minuit) - Althusser,
Louis (2008) On Ideology (London:
Verso) - Althusser,
Louis (1969) For Marx (Harmondsworth) - Gramsci,
A (1971) Selections from the Prison
Notebooks (London: G Nowell Smith) - Adler,
M (1975) ‘Ideology as Appearance’, in Austro-Marxism
(Oxford) - Balibar,
Etienne (1990) The Nation Form: History
and Ideology (Research Foundation of SUNY) - Balibar,
Etienne (1995) The Philosophy of Marx (Verso) - Zizek,
Slavoj (1989) The Sublime object of
Ideology (Verso) - Foucault,
Michel (1970) The Order of Things (Vintage
Book Editions) - Veblen,
Thorstein (2007) The Theory of the
Leisure Class (Oxford University Press) - Poulantzas,
N (1973) Political Power and Social
Classes (London) - Poulantzas,
N (1975) Classes in Contemporary
Capitalism (London) - Anthony,
P.D. (1977) The Ideology of Work
(London) - Bates,
T.R. (1975) ‘Gramsci and the theory of hegemony’, Journal of the History of Ideas, vol.36, pp.251-366 - Zeldin,
T. (1970) Conflicts in French Society
(Yale University Press) © 2014 James HadesAuthor's Note
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Added on April 23, 2014Last Updated on April 23, 2014 Tags: capitalism, illusion, life, society, fight club, essay, academic, literature Author
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