1978 - 1984: South Africa under Botha

   In 1978, Vorster resigned after being implicated in the Muldergate Scandal.  His successor Botha’s leadership saw a divergence from traditional Apartheid policies, specifically those focusing on the ‘pettier’ aspects of segregation.  He saw White South Africa facing a ‘total onslaught’ from African and Communist forces within and outside the country.  He proposed a ‘total strategy’ to counter it, which while on one hand entailed a greater focus on the military and on White unity, also included limited reform.  Influx control laws were relaxed and Botha attempted to create a skilled African middle class, though the extent to which these changes were a result of international pressure is up for debate. 

   Internationally, between 1978 and 1984, foreign countries remained divided over South Africa.  In the West there was consistent opposition from Scandinavia, but Britain and the USA stayed ambivalent.  President Reagan (1981-1989) believed a policy dubbed ‘constructive engagement’ could result in reforms of Apartheid.  This policy added to a larger debate over sanctions, but in the short term did little to put pressure on the South African government.  Prime Minister Thatcher took a similar ideological approach.  Both shared a firm opposition to Communism, viewing South Africa as a vital ally against the Soviet threat at a time of heightened tensions during the Cold War, therefore vastly reducing their desire to place pressure for sanctions.  However French President Mitterrand, elected in 1981, took a staunch anti-Apartheid position; Tambo credited him as ending French support for South Africa.[1]  Botha’s reforms, limited as they were, may have been partially an attempt to appease hostile nations such as France.

   On the African continent, South Africa became increasingly isolated.  Rhodesia’s government, South Africa’s only remaining ally, decided to negotiate with African groups in 1979 and, in 1980, the country was rebranded ‘Zimbabwe’ with Robert Mugabe as leader.  An independent Zimbabwe was dangerous to South Africa: it could allow African resistance groups to be based along the border and conduct operations within South African territory, as well as accept political refugees,[2] having the effect of increasing internal resistance.  Nevertheless, South Africa still held considerable influence over its neighbours.  Zunes is of the view that African states would be “extremely wary of harbouring guerrillas”, partly due to their economic reliance on South Africa but also as a result of increased South African raids into their sovereign territories.[3]  Despite its physical isolation as the last remaining state in Africa under White rule, South Africa by 1984 continued to maintain influence over its neighbours.

   For South Africa, the 1980s would become a decade dominated by the international debate on the merits and problems of economic sanctions.  Even Britain and the USA participated in some sanctions. The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries imposed the first sanctions on South Africa in the form of oil, however lacked the ability to enforce it.  Barnes accuses multinational oil companies, fearful of losing their market in South Africa, of having assisted the government in circumventing sanctions.[4]

   Generally, both sides of the debate were agreed on the need to take action to encourage a change to Apartheid policies, however disagreed on the most effective methods to do so.  Those arguing for sanctions, trade boycotts and disinvestment made the case that economic isolation would have a direct impact upon the White population, thus breaking through the government’s propaganda and helping to reinforce ideas of the unsustainability and unpopularity of Apartheid - trying to foster change from within.  Davenport and Saunders point to evidence such as the shrinking of the South African economy between the 1960s and the 1980s as evidence of the effectiveness of sanctions.[5]  On the other hand, a commonly cited criticism was that sanctions would have the counter-productive effect of making life worse for Africans while not having a direct impact upon the government.  Unsurprisingly, most published criticisms of such economic measures were written before the Apartheid system collapsed in 1994.  Kaempfer, Lehman and Lowenberg argued against excessive sanctions, stating that to sanction too many areas of trade at once reduced the threat of further sanctions, removing an incentive for the government to negotiate.[6]  Reagan and Thatcher's 'constructive engagement' policies took a similar stance; they believed that economic development and Apartheid were incompatible, and so to increase trade links with South Africa would naturally undermine Apartheid through the urbanisation of Africans and the need to increase African spending power.  However, this theory assumed Apartheid existed only through economic necessity and overlooks the radical belief among many Afrikaners that Apartheid was the only system which could ensure the survival of their race.  These Afrikaners would hold this belief even if the economic arguments for Apartheid became completely devalued.  Barber also criticises this view, stating that it "ignores the importance of political decisions in socio-economic development."[7] 

   Alongside economic pressures stood the culture boycotts, which were in some ways equally as effective.  These boycotts were intended to isolate South Africa culturally, both by restricting the rights of their academics, artists and sportspeople to participate abroad and also to limit those entering the country.  Cultural boycotts had the greatest impact in sport, particularly rugby.  In New Zealand, since 1969 the Halt All Racist Tours had campaigned against sporting ties between the two countries, with partial success �" the respective teams did not play one another between 1981 and 1994.[8]  In 1977, the Commonwealth had approved the Gleneagles Agreement, a commitment to cease sporting links with South Africa, acting to further ostracise the South African government.  South Africa was effectively barred from the Olympic Games; its last participation had been in 1960.  Beinart mentions that for the Whites, whose identity was "mixed up with sport", the boycott "brought the issue of apartheid into arenas in which people were not usually forced to confront such questions,"[9] By doing so, many Whites were forced to reconsider their government's policies.  On the other hand, the cultural boycott have been criticised for making the government more defiant.  It has also been suggested that by exposing White South Africans to outside views through the cultural mediums of television, radio and foreign artists, they would be exposed to more liberal opinions on racial issues, helping to break through government propaganda.[10]  This lack of unity on the cultural boycott limited its potential impact.

   Overall, the international situation had developed considerably between 1978 and 1984.  Despite Britain and the USA’s constructive engagement policies, the world began to take concerted action to oppose Apartheid.  South Africa became completely isolated on the African continent and, although its dominance continued, doubts grew over the sustainability of this supremacy.  Arguments over the imposition of economic sanctions and cultural boycotts largely swayed in favour of isolating South Africa.  By 1984 the Apartheid system had begun to unravel, and although ten years would pass before ending completely, its roots can be traced back to foreign pressure during the early 1980s.

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[1] Reddy, E.S. (ed), 1991. Oliver Tambo: Apartheid and the International Community. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers. P. 80.

[2] Edgar (ed). 1990. Sanctioning Apartheid.  pp. 360-361.

[3] Zunes. 1999. The Role of Non-Violent Action in the Downfall of Apartheid. p. 144

[4] Barnes, Catherine., 1990. International Isolation and Pressure for Change in South Africa. [online]. p. 38.

[5] Davenport & Saunders. 2000. South Africa: A Modern History. p. 539.

[6] Kaempfer, William H. Lehman, James A. & Lowenberg, Anton D., 1987. Divestment, Investment Sanctions, and Disinvestment: An Evaluation of Anti-Apartheid Policy Instruments in International Organisation. Vol 41, No 3. [online]. pp. 471-472.

[7] Barber, James., 1973. South Africa’s Foreign Policy 1945-1970. p. 296

[8] African Activist Archive., n.d. Halt All Racist Tours [online] Available at: http://africanactivist.msu.edu/organization.php?name=Halt+All+Racist+Tours [Accessed 12 March 2013].

[9] Beinart. 2001. Twentieth Century South Africa. pp. 230-31.

[10] Edgar, Robert E. (ed), 1990. Sanctioning Apartheid. Africa World Press. p. 402