1966 - 1978: South Africa under Vorster

   Following Verwoerd’s assassination in 1966, Vorster assumed leadership and continued along the path of Apartheid he had forged.  During his leadership, South Africa, faced with an increasing threat from African resistance groups, operated increasingly as a police state.  This culminated in countrywide instability following the Soweto Uprising in 1976 and the death of Steve Biko in 1977, a leading figure of the ‘Black Consciousness’ movement.  The Homelands policy was taken further; two had been declared ‘independent’ countries by 1978.

   Vorster's leadership saw continued indecision from Western governments on whether to oppose South Africa, partly because of an expanding Communist threat and partly due to the election of less critical leaders.  Britain's stance depended on the current government: Heath's Conservative government (1970-1974) has been described by O'Meara as "resolved to resume supplying arms to South Africa,"[1] but Wilson and Callaghan's Labour governments (1974-1979) appeared once again more critical.  It was the Labour government which terminated the Simonstown Agreement in 1975, and, although Davenport and Saunders argue that the agreement had little strategic advantage by that point[2], it did remove any links Britain had left with South Africa, furthering its isolation.  O'Meara goes as far as to say Britain 'abandoned' the agreement, suggesting firmer opposition.[3]  In the USA, the Nixon and Ford administrations (1969-1977) took the view that they would have more influence over South African policies by the creation of stronger ties. 

   If Western governments were hesitant to oppose Apartheid, there was certainly no such hesitation amongst their citizens and within the media.  In Britain, the Anti-Apartheid Movement had broad support and kept the issue at the forefront of British politics.  Culpin states that the movement successfully put pressure on British governments to oppose Apartheid through methods including organised boycotts of South African products, demonstrations and targeting companies which had operations in South Africa.[4]  The International Defence and Aid Fund had been established in 1965 after the Rivonia Trial.  Among the Fund's activities were paying lawyers to defend South Africans on trial for 'treason'.  In the words of its founder Canon Collins, it "exposed the activities" of the South African government.[5]  Although merely an inconvenience to the South African government itself, these groups nevertheless did offer support to those who opposed Apartheid from within, and to the liberation movements in exile.

   The exceptions towards Western political inaction were the Scandinavian countries.  Olof Palme, Prime Minister of Sweden (1969-1976), in particular was an outspoken critic of Apartheid and offered both political and economic support to the liberation movements.  Sweden's only condition was that the funds must not be used to purchase weapons[6], but the liberation movements were free to use the money for food, clothing, communication technology and other means which would aid the struggle.  Alex Boraine, an anti-Apartheid South African politician, complained that Scandinavian countries were 'suspicious' of white Liberals and only willing to support African groups[7], though they certainly did more to fight Apartheid that any other Western country.  The fact that largely homogeneous, respectable White countries would criticise Apartheid in such a way further exemplified how far removed Apartheid was from international norms, and may have caused other politicians in South Africa to reconsider their position.

   Although many countries were individually disinclined to oppose South Africa, the United Nations continued to pass resolutions condemning Apartheid.  After the violence of the Soweto Uprising, which is estimated to have left over 500 people dead including many children, and the death of Biko in police custody, a fierce reaction had been provoked within the Western media.  Particularly shocking was the publication in many Western newspapers of a photograph showing Mbuyisa Makhubo carrying a dying Hector Pieterson from the scene, which put human faces to the event and galvanised international public sympathy.  The Security Council in 1977 voted unanimously to impose an arms sanction on South Africa, largely in response to the uprising, which Stulz has described as "an unprecedented step"[8] in putting pressure on South Africa and, while that is true, it may not have been as effective as would have been hoped.  Zunes argues that the arms sanction did not have a large impact due to the number of weapons which illegally continued to find a way into South Africa and the fact that the South African military was almost self-sufficient by 1977.[9]  Nevertheless, this show of international unity created another inconvenience for South Africa and would have fed a growing debate within the country over the sustainability of Apartheid.  The world was also united in rejecting the South African government’s Homeland policy - no country ever recognised them as independent states.

   During the 1970s, events in Africa looked increasingly worse for South Africa.  12 more African countries gained independence between 1966 and 1978, further establishing African rule across the continent.  Liberation struggles ravaged Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia, highlighting to White South Africans the threat they might one day themselves face.  In 1974, a Portuguese coup resulted in the decision to grant independence to Angola and Mozambique, thus removing the barrier of White states protecting South Africa from the rest of Africa (see Appendix B on page 25).  This allowed armed groups to operate closer to home[10], particularly in Mozambique, and set up guerrilla camps, thereby increasing the threat they posed to the government. 

   After the independence of Angola and Mozambique, the ruling parties both declared a people's republic in their respective country, extending Communism to Southern Africa for the first time.  Western governments feared that a foothold in the region could result in South Africa falling under Communist rule.  The fact that Soviet-backed liberation movements had formed Communist governments after having achieved power was undoubtedly a major factor in the Western hesitancy to oppose Apartheid, as it set a precedent for what could happen if the ANC gained power.  However, Thompson plays down the threat Soviet expansion posed to South Africa, arguing that the region was not seen as a major priority.[11]  Nevertheless, this expansion, while on one hand making South Africa more vulnerable than it had ever been, also pushed it closer to Western nations and helped to safeguard Apartheid from Western action.

   Overall, the period between 1966 and 1978 saw gradual developments in the pressures foreign countries placed on the Apartheid regime.  Scandinavian, African and Communist countries were the most active in their opposition, although even Britain and the USA, influenced by pressure groups, began to take a more hostile position.  Nevertheless, either through a lack of capability or of will between foreign countries, the pressures had limited effects upon South Africa’s policies. 

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[1] O’Meara, Dan., 1996. Forty Lost Years. Ohio: Ohio University Press. p.170.

[2] Davenport & Saunders. 2000. South Africa: A Modern History. p. 540.

[3] O’Meara. 1996. Forty Lost Years. p.182.

[4] Culpin, Christopher., 2000. South Africa Since 1948. Dubai: Hodder Murray. p. 101

[5] Ibid. p. 100

[6] Sellström, Tor. (ed), 2002. Liberation in Southern Africa: Regional and Swedish Voices. 2nd ed. Stockholm: Elanders Gotab. p. 167.

[7] Ibid. p. 107.

[8] Stultz. 1991. Evolution of the United Nations Anti-Apartheid Regime. p. 20.

[9] Zunes. 1999. The Role of Non-Violent Action in the Downfall of Apartheid. p. 141

[10] Beinart, William., 2001. Twentieth Century South Africa. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 231

[11] Thompson. 2001. A History of South Africa. p. 216.